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ARTICLE 
POLITICS, EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE, AND 
TRANSFORMATIVE LAW IN THE CULTURE 
OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
JmlN C. REfTZ* 
ABSTRACT 
In the last two decades Latin America has experienced a significant 
resurgence of democracy, yet efforts to strengthen the independcnce of the 
judiciary, largely focused on institutional reforms of the judiciary itself, 
have been disappointing. It is apparently not enough to construct an appro-
priate judiciary. How can one keep the nation's politicians from trying to 
control the judges? Through a wide-ranging historical and comparative 
method. this article seeks to explore the culture of judicial independence by 
asking what the political and social logic in favor of and opposed to judicial 
independence is. This article seeks to contribute to the cultural approach, 
first by understanding the enduring strength of the opposing culture, the 
culture supporting political control over the courts, and second, by explor-
ing the argument that a belief in law's ability to transform society character-
izes cultures supporting reasonable levels of judicial independence. If belief 
in transformative law is an important feature of the culture of judicial inde-
pendence, then perhaps that belief can be deployed against the perennial 
claims for political control. Strategies designed to strengthen belief in trans-
formative law by improving the effectiveness of laws intended to be trans-
formative, it is argued, could be promising ways of supplementing 
institutional reforms by increasing cultural support for judicial 
independence. 
;, Edward L. Carmody Profes~or of Law and As<;oc:iale Dean for International and Compar-
ative Lal,.\! Progral11~, University of Iowa Colleg~ of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges 
helpfuil'olllmcnrs from participants at the sympO~il1111 on economic development and social jus-
tke in Latin America at the Uni\'crsity of SI. Thomas School of Law on March 7, 2008, and from 
participants in [he Iuwa Legal Studies Worbhop in May 2008, as well as comments from Jay 
Krishnan and Kim Schcppele on laICr drafts; principal research assistance by Judith Faucette, 
Sharon Stevens, and MingJ'eng Zhang; editorial as~istance ti'om the student editors of this journal; 
sLimmer research support from the University of Iowa Law Foundation; the support or Dean 
Carolyn Joncs; and encouragement from my wife, Shllryn Huriuux Reitz. 
743 
744 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL I Vol. 5:3 
The argument starts by using the ancient Chinese debate over law and 
morality and the resulting dynastic Chinese legal system as a springboard 
for examining the culture that supports the primacy of politics. In the sense 
of that debate, politics is the primary competitor for law, and we can see 
that the tension bctween law and politics remains relevant for all societies, 
even or perhaps especially, for democracies. The ever-present strength of 
this competition meanS that it is counterproductive and wrong to conceive 
of judicial independence as a goal in and of itself. The ideal has to be, 
rather, a reasonable balance between judicial independence and political in-
fluence or oversight over the judges. The strength of the competition from a 
commitment to politics also explains why, in a modern democracy, it is the 
executive branch that tends to pose the chief threat to the independence of 
the judiciary. The executive is the political branch that is organized in a 
way that gives it the greatest capacity to exercise political influence over 
the judges. 
The transformative law thesis addresses this competition between judi-
cial independence and executive dominance over the judges. The basic ar-
gument is that the need to create structural protections for the judges such 
as limitations on executive involvement in the appointment, promotion, dis-
ciplining, and dismissal of judges becomes obvious to a broad public in the 
case of law th8t is expected to change society. The argument draws on 
scholarship comparing Western law with traditional Tslamic law, another 
society with a developed legal tradition but one that does not appear to have 
been characterized by either transformative law or structural protections for 
judicial independence. It also uses a model proposed by Martin Shapiro for 
examining basic issues concerning the legitimacy of courts. An overview of 
the development of structural protections for judicial independence in the 
United States, France, and Great Britain provides some evidence in support 
of the transformative law thesis because in each of these countries, the de-
velopment of significant institutional protections is associated with the de-
velopment of judicial review of legislation, a form of public law that I argue 
constitutes an important source of transformative law. The article concludes 
with a discussion of some of the key values that appear to be associated 
with a culture committed to the transformative view of law, especially im-
personal application of the law and an interest in strengthening equality. 
and a brief exploration of several suggestions for further reform in Latin 
America that would be warranted by the transfonnative thesis. 
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Judicial independence is commonly said to be at the heart of virtually 
all conceptions of the rule of law.' For that reason, all arounel the world, 
efforts to strengthen the rule of law often focus on reforms of the judiciary2 
In Latin America, the wave of democratization in the 1980s was followed 
by a wave of judicial reform projects in the 1990s, primarily focusing on 
institutional models anel procedures, often modeled expressly on developed 
country institutions.' But a substantial body of commentary has viewed the 
I. See, e,g., Ralf Dahrendorf, A C0I1fusiuII (!t PrFII'ers.' Politics ({lid the Rllfe of La1l', 40 
MODERN L. REV. I> 9 (1977); Lydia Brashear Tiede, J!rdicia/ Independence: Of tell Cited, /?orely 
UIJc/el"sfOod, 15 J, CONTEJ\-1P. LEGf\!. ISSUES 119, 129 (2006). 
2. See, e.g., Hiram E, Chodosh, Emergellceji'OII1 the Dilel11l1w.\' ofJI1Slice Reform, 38 TEX. 
INT'L LJ. 587(2003) (discussing problems ofjuclicial reform in a number of coul1lfics). 
3. MMH( U.'JGAR, ELUSIVE REr-ORM: DE\10CRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN 
AMEfUC'A 140-41 (2002) (newly democratic regimes in Latin America focused judicial reforms on 
four areas: (,1) selection and appointment, (2) training and discipline, (3) criminal procedure, and 
(4) finances); Jorge L. EsquiroJ, The FlIiled L(lW of Latin America, 56 AM. J. Cm.1P. L. 75, 95 
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results as basically disappointing" The persisting problems are said to in-
clude widespread popular distrust of the judiciary,S violence against the ju-
dlciary,6 "inefficiency, corruption, and resistance to reform,"? and even 
excessive independence on the part of the judges and lack of sufficient ac-
countability' In fact, there are calls for greater judicial accountability," 
But most ominous are the ways that executive branches in a number of 
countries have sought to undermine judicial independence through court 
packing and other direct intervenLons in the judiciary, JO For reasons 
(2008) (emphasis on inslilution-building); id. at 99 (democratization and judicial reform); Carlos 
Suntiso, The F:fusive Quesr jor the Rille of Law: Promoting l!ldicia! Reform ill Laril! Americ(/, 23 
BR,-\ZILiAN J. POL. ECON. 112, 132 (2003) (the "mirage of 'instituLional modeling'" led to replica-
tion of developed country models; "[i]t was naively assumed that the adoption of new lmvs and 
the creations of new judicial institutions would suffice to anchor the nile of law"). 
4. See, e.g., LINN HAI'.IMEROREN, ENVISIONING REFORM 3 (2007) (describing reforms that 
began in the early 1980s as tbcLlsed on institutions and procedures); WILLlA'I'I C. PRILLAMAN, THE 
Jl'DICIARY AND DEfl10CRATIC DECAY IN LATIN AMERICA: DECLINING CONf'IDENCE IN TilE RCLE OF 
LAW 8, 19 (2000); Christina Biebesheimer, Justice Reform in Lmin America alld the C(/ribbean: 
The lOB Perspective, ill RULE OF LAW I~ LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION Of' 
JUDICIAL RErORl'd 99, 99-100 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001); Pilar Domingo & 
Rachel Sieder, COllclusions: Promoting the Rull! of Law in L[lfill America, in THE RVLE Or LAW 
IN LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION 01' lLlDlCIAL REFORM 142, 151 (Pilar Dom-
ingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001); Juan C. Mendez, lnsfiwtion(/I Reform, Inefuding Acces.\ to 
Justice: Iwmdllcfioll, ill THE (TJN)RIfT F OF I.AW AND TH" lJNDERPR1VII.EC,FD IN LATIN AMERICA 
221 (Juan Mendez et al. eds., 1999). But see Esquiroi, SIIpra note 3 (arguing that the rhetoric of 
"failed law" in Latin America is a destructive overgeneralization thaL undermines law in the re-
gion and distorts the refol'ln agenda). 
We have also been warned nOL Lo ovc.rgcl1eralize about Latin American countries because 
there is no monolithic Latin American culture. Daniel Brinks, Judicial Reform WId Illdepem/ell(.'l! 
i/l Endl and Argellfi!l(/: The Beginnillg of (/ New Milfenllillm?, 40 TEX. lNT'L LJ. 595 (2005); 
Esquirol, .wpm note 3, at 84-85 ("there is 110 such thing as 'Latin American law' in general"; 
recognizing that tbere are, however, strong commonalities among Latin American countries and 
certain common prohlems with their legal systems, but arguing against overgeneralization of those 
critiques). I will try to avoid the worst excesses of gencralization by specifying in the citations as 
carefully as possible which countries are the source for the various facts and opinions on whkh 
my argument relies. 
5. PR!LLAMAN, slfjJm note 4, at 8; Domingo & Sieder, slIpra note 4, at 151; Linn Hammer-
gren, E.rpandillff the Rille oILal'.': Judiciol R~f'orl/l il! Latin Alllericu, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. 
L. REV, 60[,603-04 (2005). 
6. PRILLAMAN, supra note 4, at 21 (Colombia). 
7. Domingo & Sieder, slIpm note 4, at 147. 
8. PRILLAMAN. supro note 4, at 21-·22 (Bolivia, Ecuador); Brinks, supra note 4, at 613-21 
(Brazil); Santiso, slIpra nole 3, at 118-22 (Brazil). 
9. Mary Dakolias, Atrackillg Corruption ill tire Judiciwy; A Criti('(l{ Process ill Jwficiul 
R(/imll, 18 WIS. INT'L LJ. 353, 376 (2000); (j: T. Leigh Anenson, Note, For Whom the Befl Tolls 
... Judicial Selecfioll by Electioll ill Larin America, -+ Sw. J.L. & TRc\DE AM. 261 (1997) (U.S. 
Imv "WdeHt advocating ekction of judges in Latin America). 
10. See, e.g., PR1!.l.AtI.'(,.l,.N, .\'11])/'(/ note 4, at 19-20; UNGAR, slIpra note 3, at 143 ("[E]xecLltive 
rarely loses its determination to stock the judiciary with friendly judges, sidelining new ll1erit-
based procedures in the process, and practices such as patl'Onage, fnvoritism, and discriminatory 
prosecution are engrained into internal judicial fLlllctioning."); Lauren Castaldi, NOLe, Juilicial 
IlIiIe/lel/dence Threafened in Vene::'III!1l/; The Rt'IJIOI'(11 uf Vellez'!lefan Judges and flu' COlllpli('(/-
lions {?{ Rille (!f'L(/\1' Re,{()J'IJ/, 37 OED. J. INT'L L. 477 (2006) (detailed accounL of ways th([L 
Chavez :lchninistration hit;; undermined Venezuelan court independence; even when the restric-
tion::. h~l\e formally been imposed by legislature or independent commission. the executivt' has 
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explained below, this article concentrates on the threat of executive 
dominance. 11 
The persistence of executive interference with the courts despite recent 
democratization seems paradoxical in view of the widespread belief that 
judicial independence matters to democracy, as well as the rule of law. In 
an authoritarian state in which the I1Jling party uses force to maintain its 
hold on power, only a relatively small group of people, the ruler and his 
supporters, determine public policy. Their self-interest is obviously served 
by seeking to control the judiciary, which otherwise could be an arm .of 
state power they do not control. There is no need for any further explana-
tion for the pattern of executive efforts to control the courts. But today 
many countries throughout Latin America are characterized by a resurgence 
of significant levels of competitive democratic participation. Why do the 
electorates not demand more independent courts? Why do they not insist on 
"institntional" or "structural" gnarantees of judicial independence such as 
rules on appointment, promotion, discipline, and dismissal of judges or 
guarantees of pay that eliminate or limit executive branch authority over the 
judges?12 More importantly, why do tlley let politicians ignore or eliminate 
been able to dominate the process); Hugo FrCihling, Judicial Reform (mel Democratization in Latin 
America, in FAULT LINES OF DEMOCRACY IN POS';"~TRANSITION LATIN AMERICA 237, 237 (Felipe 
Aguero & Jeffrey Stark eds., 1998) (Latin American courts "are neither independent nor effec, 
tive"; they have "suffered from political manipulation by both democratic and military govern-
ments"); Jose Alberto Ramirez Leon, Why Further Development of ADR in Latin America Makes 
Sense: The Vellezuelan Model, 2005 J. Drsp. RESOL. 399 (C01l11 packing in Venezuela); Jon Mills, 
Prillciples for Constitutions and Institutions in Promoting the Rule of Law, 16 FLA. 1. INT'L L. 115 
(2004) (limiting tenure, court packing, purges, restricting jurisdiction by creating special tribu, 
l1als); Santiso, supra note 3, at 119 (Menem's court packing in Argentina); (f. Keith S. Rosenn, 
The Protection of Judicia/Independence in Latin America, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 
(1987) (long historical tradition in many Latin American countries of techniques like formally 
abrogating judicial independence, bypassing courts by creating special tribunals, purges of judges, 
transference or reassignment of judges, refusing to enforce decisions, and other forms of executive 
domination). 
11, For argument that execlltive dominance is the cbief threat to judicial independence, see 
infra section II(B). See also PRILLAMAN, supra note 4, at 19-20; UNGAR, supra note 3, at 143 
("Executive power and judicial weakness ... limit reforms' effectiveness."); cf Tiede, supra note 
1, at 131-32 (defining judicial independence as independence from the executive branch on the 
grounds that this definition gives the most meaningful, analytically useful measure). 
Bribery is also a threat to judicial independence, probably in aU countries to some extent, but 
it is difficult to gauge the relative seriousness of the problem in different countries. Moreover, it 
may simply be the way executive dominance is exercised, see, e.g., ADRIAAN BEDNER, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE COURTS IN INDONESIA 237 (2001) (executive branch bribes judges in Indonesia), or a 
method of resistance to executive dominance. See LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE CULTURE OF ISLAM: 
CHANGING ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM LIFE 66-67 (2002) (quoting Moroccan infor-
mants as saying that bribery is their form of democracy because it is through bribery of officials 
that they can limit the ruler's power). At any rate, executive dominance is essentially a different 
problem from bribe!';'. Section II will argue that it is systemic, and wlinging our hands over 
conuption may obscure cultural features that support executive dominance over the courts. 
J 2. Throughout the paper, and especially in section IV, I use the adoption of institutional or 
structural protections for judges as evidence of the strength of ,a culture supportive of judicial 
independence. It is, of course, only a rough measure. Institutional proleclions do not guarantee 
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existing institutional guarantees? If electcci leaders can dominate the judici-
ary and there are popular calls to make the judges politically more answera-
ble, then we have to take seriously the possibility that even in a democracy 
there can be a broad population with a set of attitudes, values, and ideolo-
gies-in short, a "culture" 13-that supports significant political controls on 
the judiciary. What is it that promotes that culture or its opposite, a culture 
that supports reasonable stlUctural protections for judicial independence?l4 
This article concentrates on understanding the dynamic in a democratic 
state that determines the balance between the culture of judicial indepen-
dence and the culture of executive dominance. My assumption is that if we 
can identify mechanisms that promote the culture of judicial independence 
among the population at large, then reformers interested in strengthening 
judicial independence can devise strategies to put that dynamic to work, and 
we will also be able to identify which values appear to be associated with 
that dynamic. The article pursues this topic through two related lines of 
inquiry, using a wide-ranging and perhaps idiosyncratic historical and com-
pm'ative method that starts with two older, non-Western l5 legal systems that 
judicial independence if politicians fail to respect the structural protections or easily amend or 
circumvent the laws establishing the protections. See, e.g., Brinks, supra note 4, at 608 (Argen-
tina); Castaldi, supra note 10 (Chavez's efforts in Venezuela to undermine judicial independence); 
Robert Stevens, The Independence o/the Judiciary; The Ca.ye of England, 72 S. CAL. L REV. 597, 
601 (1999) (Prime Minister Lloyd George required his Lord Chief Justice to sign an undated letter 
of resignation upon his appointment in 1921, which he then used to remove that judge in 1922). It 
is also possible, though not probable, that judges could have substantial independence without the 
benefit of such protections. See infra note 144 (some commentators viewed French administrative 
law judges as significantly independent even before the recent institutional reforms); note 165 
(Shapiro's claim of the de facto independence of the British judges); note 170 (Islamic judges). 
But the adoption of institutional safeguards is at least the expression of a polity's belief that 
judicial independence is important. 
13. I do not think it is necessary for this paper to identify exactly whose culture I am speak-
ing about. The important point is that the relevant group for these questions of culture is not 
necessarily limited to the judges and the leaders of the execlltive branch. It is a broader group. 
There are at least three possibilities: (a) the mass public as a whole; or (b) the legal elite of bench, 
bar, and legal academe; or (c) the broader elite that is formed by lawyers and aU nonlawyers who 
engage in a significant and professional way with law ancl the courts, such as the representatives 
of the media who report on legal matters and perhaps even business leaders who make signitlcant 
lise of legal services. Probably, at different times and on different issues, one or another of these 
groups may be most important. I also understand "culture" to refer in general to a combination of, 
on the one hand, attitudes, values, and ideologies, and, on the other, behavior. Behavior such as 
tolerating or not tolerating executive interference with the courts or enacting institutional restraints 
on executive control of the courts can be strong evidence of attitudes, values, or ideology and may 
also shape and foster those attitudinal aspects of culture. 
14. The article thus joins those who adopt a culture-based approach to the problem of judicial 
independence to supplement the institutional approach. See, e.g., Martin Krygier, The Rille of 
Law: Legality, Teleolog)'! Sociology, in RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW {Oianluigi Palombella & 
Neil Walker eds., 2008) (arguing for a sociology of the rule of law); Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil's 
Legal Culture: The leito Revisited, 1 FLA. 1. INT'L L. 1 (1984); Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism 
Through the Looking Glass of Latin America, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1. 35 (2006) (exploring the 
"social moorings" for constitutionalism). 
15. The dichotomy between the ;'West" and the rest is problematic in many ways, not the 
least of which is that some of my chief informOltion about Islamic law comes from scholarship 
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did not develop institutional protecl'ions for judicial independence, ancient 
Chinese law and traditional Islamic law. 
Section II opens the first line of inquiry concerning one of the chief 
arguments for political influence over the judges that continues to have 
force today. the claim for the primacy of politics. My theory is that we 
cannot appreciate the dynamic that might favor judicial independence un-
less we also understand the opposite. 16 Section II uses the ancient Chinese 
debate about governing a society through law or morality-a debate that 
resulted in a pronOlll1ced preference for morality over law-as a spring-
board for this inquiry. Because of the continuing power of the claim for the 
primacy of politics, this section argues, it is wrong to conceive of the rule of 
law ideal as requiring completely independent judges. The ideal has to be, 
rather, a reasonable balance between judicial independence and political in-
fluence or oversight over the judiciary. This point is not new; other scholars 
have emphasized the need for balance within the rule of law paradigm.17 
The sharpness of the contrast with the very different legal system of dynas-
tic China is meant to provide a fresh presentation of the argument to 
counteract standard rule of law rhetoric claiming that judges should simply 
be independent. The contrast also is meant to help us see with greater clar-
ity the importance for law of a value that was explicitly rejected in the 
Chinese debate, equality under the law. Section II closes with the argument 
that the contil1Lling attraction of politicd control over the judges explains 
why it is the executive branch in modern democracies that tends to pose the 
chief threat to judicial independence, as we see in Latin America. 
about M_orocco, and Morocco extends further to the west than much of Western Europe, including 
France. Nevertheless, I use the term "modern Western legal traditions" to refer to the legal tradi-
tions of those countries in Western Europe ancl North America, as well as Australia and New 
Zealand, which are generally thought to institute the strongest or least problematic forms of the 
rule of law today. By using that terminology, I do not mean to suggest either that the legal systems 
of these countries perfectly fit the rule of law ideal or that Latin America is not part of the "West." 
Modern Latin American countries are heirs to the sane Western legallraditions. But I do take as a 
premise to this article the suggestion of many authors that the legal systems in many Latin Ameri-
can legal systems differ more substantially from the rule of law ideal than do the aforementioned 
legal systems, especially in the respect tbat the judiciaries in many Latin American cOLlJ1tries have 
less independence than in the aforementioned countries. 
16. q: A.A. MILNE, THE HOUSE AT POOH CORNER 123-24 (1956) (in which Pooh, los! with 
Piglet in the misty forest but repeatedly stumbling across a certain sandpit, suggests finding tbe 
way home by deliberately wandering away from the pit and then trying to find it). 
17. See, e.g., PRfLLAMAN, supra note 4, at 19 (failure of Latin American judiCiaries "to 
achieve the delicate balance between judicial independence ancl judicial accoul1lability"); Stephen 
B. Burbank. & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering .Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
AT THE CROSSROADS 9, 12, 14-16 (Stephen B. Burbank & BaiTY Friedman eds., 2002) (com-
pletely independent courts would be intolerable; fatber, judicial independence and accountBbility 
are different sides of same coin); cf. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS 34 (1981) (saying descriptively, 
not normatively, that the U.S. debate over election of judges is "unresolvable because it involves 
two conflicting goals: one, that [courts as] triadic conflict resolvers be independent; two, that 
[courts as] lawmakers be responsible to the peopJe.")~ Tiede, supra note J, at 159-60 (noting ways 
in which judicial independence is contrary to rule 0: law values). 
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Section III opens the second line of inquiry, which explores the argu-
ment that a belief in the role of law to transform society characterizes the 
Western cultures that support reasonable levels of judicial independence 
and that such a belief creates a dynarrjc capable of countering the claims of 
politics and building popular support for limiting executive power over 
courts. The basic logic of the transformative law thesis is tbat the need to 
create structural protections from executive overreaching with regarll to 
such things as the recruitment, selection, pay, promotion, disciplining, and 
dismissal of judges becomes obvious to a broad public in the case of law 
that is expected to change society, because the executive is always an inter-
ested party in such legal disputes. This thesis is not offered as an exclusive 
explanation for the development of greater degrees of judicial indepen-
dence, but as a restatement or refinement of some of the chief alternative 
theories and one that promises to be especially useful to reformers seeking 
to increase cultural support for judicial independence in Latin America. 18 I 
do not, however, claim that the adoption of transformative law leads 
quickly or inexorably toward cultural reform. I only claim that strengthen-
ing popular belief in the transformative role of laW makes more likely a 
concomitant growth in popular support for judicial independence and that 
fostering that belief could therefore be a useful tool for judicial reform. 19 
Section II! begins the argument for the transformative thesis with Law-
rence Rosen's observations about traditional Islamic law,"o which appears 
to have developed neither a transformative view of law nor structural pro-
tections for the independence of judges. The section then develops the con-
trary argument for the modern Western legal traditions of civil and common 
law and builds on Martin Shapiro's model for the sociopolitical legitimacy 
of courts2l to explain how a transformative view of law might lead to the 
development of substantial public support for giving judges structural pro-
tections for their independence. Again, the sharp contrast with modern 
Western legal traditions permits us to appreciate more clearly ideals or val-
ues which are associated with a belief in transformative law. Section III 
closes with a discussion of the role that the ideals of equal and impersonal 
application of law play in a culture that supports transformative law and the 
18. See ifljl'a text accompanying notes 82-84. 
19. I suggest such strategies as ways of showing the relevance of the idea of transformative 
Imv. But this article does not take a position as to whether the judges actually should have more or 
less independence in any given country in Latin America. One important corollary of the argu-
ment in section II about the continuing tension between law and politics is that one cannot specify 
an optimum }evel of judicial independence for all countries. One has to look at the specit1c silua-
tion in each country individually. Accord Burbank & Friedman, supra note [7, at II, 16. 
20. ROSEN, supra note 11, nt 64; LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW 
AS CULTURE IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY 61 (1989) [hereinafter ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUS'rlCE]. 
21. SHAP!RO, sUpn! note 17, al 49-56; Mmtin Shapiro, Judicial Independence: The English 
Experiel1cl:', S5 N,C. L. REV. S77, 620-21 ([977) lhereinafter Shapiro, Judicial Jlldepelldl!lIcej. 
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basis for thinking that belief in transformative law and these associated val-
ues may be quite weak in at least some considerable parts of Latin America. 
Since I have been unable to find a thorough multicountry history of the 
development of institutional protections for judicial independence in mod-
ern Western legal systems, section IV offers brief historical sketches for the 
United States, France, and Great Britain. The chief purpose of these 
sketches is to argue the consistency of that hi story with both the claims 
made in section II about the enduring importance of some degree of politi-
cal influence or control over courts and the transformative law thesis of 
section III. These three histories illustrate the continuing presence of at least 
modest degrees of political influence within contemporary protections for 
judicial independence, as well as the tendency of the executive power to 
play the principal role in asserting political control, as section II argues 
should be the case. The historical sketches also show a striking association 
between the adoption of structural guarantees of judicial independence and 
the adoption of constitutional review of legislation, an aspect of public law 
that I argue inclndes important examples of what I mean by transformative 
law. I therefore argue that the historical sketches provide some support for 
the transformative law thesis. 
By way of conclusion, section V snnmarizes the key values that the 
two lines of inquiry have suggested are important in a culture that supports 
transfonnative law. According to the transfonnative law thesis\ these values 
should therefore be part of the culture that supports a reasonable level of 
judicial independence. The section closes with some examples of strategies 
for increasing the effectiveness of transformative law that already exists in 
Latin American legal systems, especially law that seeks to address serious 
inequalities. If the transformative law thesis has merit, such reforms would 
appear to offer some of the best ways to mitigate cultures of personalism 
and inequality that appear to stand in the way of developing a stronger 
culture of judicial independence in Latin America. 
II. THE DEBATE [N ANCIENT CHINA BETWEEN LAW AND MORAUTY AND 
THE CONT[NU[NG STRENGTH OF THE CLA[MS OF POUT[CS 
A. The Ancient Chinese Debate and Its Legal System 
Ancient China witnessed an important debate that is of continuing rel-
evance to all who are concerned with law today. The debate was between 
Confucius and his followers, on the one hand, and a group 'of writers and 
statesmen collectively known to history as the Fa Chia [the Fa Jia]?2 often 
22. In general, this paper gives Chinese names and terms in the common Anglicized form, 
like "Confucius," if there is one, and otherwise in the Wade-Giles system of transliteration, with 
Lhe pinyin transliteration in brackets, if it is different. In some cases Wade-Giles is a bener guide 
fa pronunciation for the nonspeciallst; in others, pinyin is better. 
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translated as "Legalists," on the other.'3 Confucius and his followers argued 
that the best way to govern a country was through education using moral 
persuasion and example. Among the Legalists, those following Lord Shang 
were staunch advocates of governing a nation through a system of thorough 
and strict laws, backed up by generous rewards and severe punishments.24 
Confucianists led the side of the debate rejecting reliance on rewards 
and punishments. Confucian thinkers believed that law (fa) was not nearly 
as important as Ii, a concept which Confucius and his followers broadened 
beyond its root meaning of "ritual" and "courtesy" to include "morality" 
and "ethical behavior."25 Confucius himself is supposed to have said: "Lead 
them by political maneuvers, restrain them with punishments [and] the peo-
ple will become cunning and shameless. [But] [l]ead them by virtue, re-
strain them with ritual [and] they will develop a sense of shame and a sense 
of participation."26 The chief point of Ii was, at least originally, to inculcate 
in each person a respect for and an understanding of the importance of 
maintaining the five essential relationships, four of which are hierarchical.27 
23. On the debate in general, see JOHN W. HEAD & YANPING WANG, LAW CODES IN DYNAS-
TIC C!:lINA 23-59 (200S) for a discussion with extensive citation to English and some Chinese 
language scholarship. See also HERRLEE O. CREEL, WHAT IS TAOISM? 92-120 (1970) (more de-
tailed analysis of the various authors who together comprise the Fa Chia); ARTHUR WALEY, 
THREE WAYS OF THOUGHT IN ANCIENT CHINA 158-61 (1939) (.on the Legalists' conception of 
law); id. at 191-96 (on Realism in action); A SOURCE BOOK IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 251-52 
(Wing-Tsil Chan ed, & trans., 1963) (on the Legalists) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK]' 
It seems probable that only certain of the philosophers ancl statesmen conventionally re-
garded as part of the Legalist school actually advocated the use of law backed LIp by heavy crimi-
nal penalties while other Legalist thinkers were rJuch more concerned with how the Emperor 
should rule by controlling the bureaucracy. CREEL, Hlpru, at 92-120 (arguing that a better transla-
tion of Fa Chio would be "Adminislrators" because; only Shang Yang (also known as Lord Yang) 
and his followers should be known as '·Legalists" for their emphasis on the use of law; Shen Pu-
hai founded another school that disapproved of the use of harsh criminal law but was primarily 
concerned with administrative measures the Emperor should use to control the bureaucracy; Han 
Fei Tzu combined the two schools in his writings, and it is his version that has tended to be 
regarded as the Fa Chia as Shen's name came to be forgotten, but it is in fact Shen's ideas about 
setting up and controlling the bureaucracy that have had the greatest impact on China); see also 
WALEY, supra, at 152 (because the concern for law was only part of their program, Fa Chia 
should be translated as '·Realists" or "Amoralists"). Part of the problem is thut the word "fa" in the 
name of this philosophic movement is ambiguous. Il could mean '·law," but it could also mean 
'·method," which fits in with Shen's emphasis on the technique of handling a bureaucracy. Ie!. at 
93. 
24. As indicated in the previolls footnote, the Fa Chi{1 probably did not constitute a unified 
school of thought, but rather a loose collection of related thinkers. It is clear that Shang Yang and 
his followers advocated reliance on the criminal laws, HEAD & WANG, supra note 23, at 63-70. 
but it appears that other Legalists agreed with the Confucianists' ctiticism of relying on harsh 
punishments. CREEL, supra note 23, at 103. 
25. HEAD & WANG, supra note 23, at 17. 
26. [d. at 39 (quoting THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS, Chapter 2, passage 2.3 (Simon Leys 
trans .. 1997)). 
27. The four unequal rel;llionships were ernperor-.'>Llbject. f:llher-son, older brother-younger 
brother, and husband-wife. The only relationship Jf equality was the relationship between two 
friends. [d. at 49. Li prescribes the appropriale behavior for each of these relationships. Thus '·the 
ideal ruler is benevolent, the idea! subordinate is loyal; the ideal father is compassionate, the ideul 
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The political theory behind Confucianism was that maintaining these rela-
tionships, including the social hierarchies immanent il1 these relationships, 
was the way to maintain social harmony and a well-governed country. The 
Legalist champions of law thought law a more powerful tool for maintain-
ing social harmony, and they stressed that the law, induding its punish-
ments, should apply to all persons equally, regardless of social rank and 
relationship. The Confucianists were hOlTified by such an approach because 
it uiolated their concept of li.n Confucian thought thus essentially called for 
creating a good society through rule by good men who would know how, in 
each situation, to maintain social harmony by treating each relationship 
with another person according to the rules of Ii. Legalists rejected the Con-
fucian political theory because they thought that moral inflnence could not 
be powerful enough to guarantee social order. Instead of rule by good men 
according to Ii, which called for different people to be treated differently, 
they called for rule by laws that punished all equally. 
It is important to understand that the morality at the heart of Con-
fucianists' concept of Ii is political morality or political philosophy. Their 
chief interest and the chief interest of their opponents in the debate over law 
concerned the best way to govern a state. As Simon Leys has written, 
The central importance of rites [Ii] in the Confucian order may at 
first appear disconcerting to some Western readers (conjuring up 
in their minds quaint images of smiling Oriental gentlemen, bow-
ing endlessly to each otber), but the oddity is merely semantic; 
one needs only to substitute for tbe word "rites" concepts such as 
"moeurs\" "civilized usages," "moral conventions,)) or even 
"common decency," and one immediately realizes that the Con-
fucian values are remarkably close to the principles of political 
philosophy which the Western world inherited from the Enlight-
enment. Montesquieu in particular. . developed notions which 
unwittingly recouped Confucius's views that a government of 
rites is to be preferred to a government of laws; Montesquieu con-
sidered that an increase in law-making activity was not a sign of 
civilization-it indicated on the coetrary a breakdown of social 
morality, and his famous statement, "Quand un people a de bonne 
son is filial [demonstrates filial obedience, respect, love, and care for the father]; the ideal elder 
brother is kind, the ideal younger brother respectful; the ideal husband is righteous, the ideal wife 
submissive; the ideal friend is faithful." Id. 
28. Some scholars argue that Confucim himself, whose own statements show that he offered 
his instruction to members of all classes, thought that whoever distinguished himself in study 
should be fit to advise rulers, and criticized class distinctions, would have rejected the way the 
school of thought that bears his name came to represent support for and rationalization of the 
class-based system of inequality that characterized dynastic China. ld. at 38, 40, 42-44, 58-59 
(citing especially Simon Leys and Hen'lee G. Creel). Be that as it may, there appears to be no 
dispute that those who took over Confucius's mantle-did uphold the class system in China and 
support large inequalilies in the Jaws. ld. at 42-43, 58-59. 
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moeurs, les lois deviennent simples" could have been lifted 
straight from the Analects [of Confuciusj.29 
The founder of the Ch'in [Qin] dynasty, Ch'in Shih [Shi] Huangti 
[Huangdi], who reigned as the first emperor of a unified China from 221 to 
210 B.C.E., gave Legalists leading roles in his government and attempted to 
suppress Confucian thinking. He is even charged with killing many people 
and burning many books in the process. Wing-Tsit Chan recounts the tradi-
tional ending to the story, emphasizing the shortness of the Legalists' reign: 
"The brutality and violence of the Ch'in brought its early downfall in 206 
B.C.E. and the Chinese, fearful of the ruthlessness of the Legalists, have 
ever since that time rejected them."30 It would be wrong, however, to con-
clude that, starting with the Han dynasty, which replaced the Ch'in and 
brought Confucianists back into government, China functioned essentially 
without law. In fact, by that time, ancient China had a long tradition of 
producing legal codes, to which the Legalists, With their interest in law, had 
. been major contributors. The Han duly adopted their own legal code, which 
appears to have drawn heavily on the Ch'in Code and other preceding Chi-
nese law codes. Through a process tha: is called "Confucianization" of the 
law, Legalist ideas about law, especially the utility of harsh criminal penal-
ties and the importance of equal application of penalties, were slowly re, 
placed by Confucian ideas favoring milder penalties and special provisions 
for more lenient treatment of offenders from the higher classes.'l The real 
outcome of the debate was not a simple victory for political morality in 
China, but a compromise in which law and law codes continued to be im-
portant tools for governance throughout dynastic China. Confucian teach-
ing, however, made political morality, backed up as needed by raw political 
power, the preferred tool for governing the country.32 
While law thus had continuing importance in dynastic China, it looked 
very different from the concept of law we know in the West. Most impor-
tantly for our subject, dynastic China provided no protections to secure the 
29. HEAD & WANG, S!/pra note 23, at 39-40 (quOling THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 
xxv-xxvi (Simon Leys trans., 1997»). 
30. SOURCE BOOK, sllpra note 23, at 251. The story is told in much greater detail in HEAD & 
WAND, supra note 23, at 6 [-104, For the debate us portrayed in a Han Dynasty document, tbe 
Discourses on Salt (IIutlron (Yell-tie lUll), see MICHAEL LOEWE, FAITH, MYTH AND REASON IN 
HAN CHINA 172-74 (1982) (qlioting parts of the Discourses). 
31. HEAD & WANG, supra note 23, at 101 (during Han Dynasty tbe harshness of crimina! 
penalties was considerably ameliorated and the beginnings of a system of more lenient punish-
ments for higher ranked classes was recognized, which was to flower into much clearer legal 
distinctions in favor of the higher classes in the codes of later dynasties, especially the Tang and 
Ch'ing); see ol,<;o id. at 96-98 (describing how Confucianist thinking came to supplant Legalist 
thinking in the interpretation of the law and, eventually, the drafting of legal codes); id. at 
109-115 (describing further Confucianization of the law in tht: period between Han and Tang 
Dynasties ('220 to 618 AD); Sl-L<\.P1RO, .wpm note 17. at 169 (describing Chinese law as a "mixture 
of mediatory and legalistic elements" under dominant Confucian philosophy). 
32. HEAD & WANG, supra note 13, nt 61-104 (again with extensive citntion to English and 
some Chinese language scholarship). 
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independence of those exercising judicial function. Dynastic China was a 
polity that "consisted of a highly centralized government headed by an ab-
solute ruler who ruled by means of a bureaucracy."" Because of reliance on 
bureaucracy for governance, there was scarcely anything that could be 
called a legal system. For example, Harold Berman has suggested that the 
following features are chief characteristics of Western legal systems: a dis-
crete body of legal professionals (lawyers and judges), to whom is entrusted 
the administration of legal institutions, who tend to engage in legal activi-
ties to the exclusion of other forms of business activity, and who have a 
special training in law in professional schools and their own professional 
literature about the law.34 China, by contrast, had little legal literature," 
hardly anyone who could be called a professional lawyer, no schools of 
law,36 and not even a specialized body of judges. The judicial function was 
fulfilled by the chief administratDr or "magistrate" in each district, who was 
also chief prosecutor and chief tax collector fDr his district. The district 
magistrate had no guarantees of independence. Quite the cDntrary, he served 
at the pleasure Df the emperor (or whoever amDng the top bureaucrats or 
eunuchs was actually in cDntrol) and the same was true of the higher level 
bureaucrats who served in the various appeals boards. 37 
The traditiDnal Chinese lack Df interest in securing the independence 
of the judicial officer dDes not, however, result from the resolution Df the 
33. TUE GREAT QINC CODE 6 (William C. Jones trans., 1994). 
34. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 8 (1983). 
35. "The role of law and jurisprudence has been far less prominent in China than in the 
West," according to Creel, though, as one would expect from a group of advocates of an expanded 
role for law, the Legalist followers of Lord Shang made a "considerable" contribution in the field 
of jurisprudence. CREEL, supra note 23, at 113. But Legalist jurisprudence apparently had little 
impact on the main body of Chinese thinking. !d.; see also THOMAS B. STEPHENS, ORDER AND 
DISCIPLINE IN CHINA 11-12 (1992) (nothing in China like the traditions of jUlisconsuIts in Roman 
law; no analogue in Chinese culture to the jurisprudential writings in the legaJ systems of the 
We~t). There are some collections of case reports that have survived from as far back as the Sung 
Dynasty and many more from the Ch'ing, HEAD & WANG, supra note 23, at 217-18, but as far as 
works tbat concern speculative analysis of the law, I can find mention of only one book from the 
Han Dynasty that discllssed the resolution of 232 hypothetical cases according to Confucian prin-
ciples, There were also commentaries on the imperial codes, which had become quite common by 
the Ch'ing Dynasly./d. a196, 207-11. But there is no indication that the commentaries attempted 
to elaborate any system of principles underlying the specific code provisions or otherwise under-
took to analyze or systematize the law in the manner of Western critical writing about law, though 
most of the commentaries have not yet been translated into a Western language. Ie!. 
36. There were people with a "superficial knowledge of the law and formalities, who offered 
their services secretly," but they were often suppressed by the government ancl did not play an 
important role in administration of the law, which was entirely in the hands of the bureaucra~y, 
which in turn was trained in literahlre and Confucian philosophy, not law. Shuzo Shiga, Some 
Remark.s on the Judicial System in China: Historical Development alld Characteristics, in TRADl-
TIONAL AND MODERN LEGAL INSTlTUTIONS IN ASlA AND AFRICA 44, 48 (David C. Buxbaum ed., 
1967). 
37. HEAD & WANG, supra note 23, at 215-17 (for Ch'ing (Qing) Dynasty); accord Shiga, 
supm note 36, at 46-51 ("[d]espite the rise and fall of many dynasties," there was no concept of 
"an independent court"; district magistrate functioned as judge;- only at higher appeal levels were 
there specialized judicial bodies, but none of the officials were trained specifically in law). 
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debate over law and politics, Even if the Legalists had triumphed in the 
debate, China would no doubt have still developed a strong reliance on a 
bureaucratic mechanism for administering the law, for it was, after all, Le-
galist thinkers, albeit from a different branch of the Fa Chia than Lord 
Shang, who developed the forms of bureaucratic governance that China was 
to use for so many centuries38 And there was no more of a basis in Legalist 
thought than in Confucian thought for arguing that the judges needed to be 
independent of the absolute mler's power. Lord Shang and his followers 
were not champions of the mle of law, They, like everyone else in ancient 
China, regarded law as a tool for securing obedience to the governing re-
gime and its values, Like everyone else in the debate, when they spoke of 
law, they meant mle by law, 
E, The Modem Relevance of the Chinese Deh,1te 
It may seem strange to insist that the debate in ancient China is impor-
tant to the understanding of the culture of judicial iudependence today, It 
was not a debate about the rule of law, and the version of law that was at 
stake in the debate was an extreme version that emphasized harsh criminal 
penalties joined to a totalitarian administc'ative system, Moreover, the de-
batc resulted in preservation of the totalitarian administrative system with 
milder criminal penalties administered in a system in which Confucian po-
litical morality, not law, was the privileged form of argument. But it was a 
debate about law versus political morality, and therefore, I argue, in effect a 
debate about law versus politics, It is thus a debate that is anterior to and 
subsumed in all other debates about the mle of law, 
The Chinese debate is ultimately a debate about the relationship be-
tween law and politics because political morality is at the heart of politics in 
a way that law is not. There is at least a fOlmal division between law and 
politics, but there is no meaningful distinction between political morality 
and politics-especially in the case of a political morality as attuned to the 
specific persons involved and their ranks and relationships as Confucian 
thought required. The very claim that something is governed by law is a 
claim that it is not governed solely by political or moral concerns while 
political morality and political philosophy are inevitably at the center of 
political discourse. The ancient debate in China thus raises an issue that 
remains contested in all modern legal systems, the proper relationship be-
tween law and politics. Is it better, for example, to seek to change societal 
behavior through law or through political action and persuasion? Can a sys-
tem of law actually achieve any lasting changes in society without concomi-
tant political changes? And if you think that a political mobilization in favor 
38. See supra note 23 (discussing Herlee Creel's study of the contributions of the wing of Fil 
Chin led by Shen Pu-Hai). 
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of change is always necessary to create meaningful, lasting social changes, 
then how important can law be?39 
Attempts in the modern world to eliminate law as a governing force 
show the continuing relevance of the Confucian side of the debate. Both the 
Russian Communists and the Chinese COlT'munists, for example, ultimately 
had to abandon their attempts to govern without law. But even if political 
leaders grudgingly make room for courts and law in the governing struc-
ture, as the Russian Communists did starting with Lenin's New Economic 
Policy and as the Chinese Communists did after the Cultural Revolution, 
the view that the Confucianists had the right side of the ancient debate still 
predominates in many corners of the world and provides a powerful, princi-
pled basis for arguing for political control over the courts. Political leaders 
of all stripes tend to be convinced of the rightness of their causes. Law is 
easily seen as an obstacle to politics, especially the politics of change, be-
cause important aspects of law tend to reflect and protect the status quo. It 
is understandable that political leaders and their most ardent supporters may 
believe in the primacy of politics over law. It is easy to slip from that posi-
tion to one that denigrates law as an obstacle to political leadership and 
independent courts as a suspect fragmentation of the pOlitical power neces-
sary to rule effectively. So we see many examples of powerful political 
leaders from both the Right and the Left seeking to weaken or eliminate the 
independence of the courts in favor of political leadership.40 
The ancient Chinese debate is thus relevant for helping us see how 
problematic it would be to view judicial independence as an absolute value, 
even in the Western legal tradition. The ancient debate was not resolved by 
a complete victory for either side, nor should either side win today. We 
glibly say that judicial independence is at the heart of the iCieal of the rule of 
law,41 and yet we cannot mean to deny entirely a role for political influence 
39. Cj Mark Tushnet, Living with a Em of Rights, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 17 
(Collor Gem1y & Adam Tomkins eds., 1996) (arguing against judicial review of legislation, in 
part, on the grounds that "if you can pass a bill of nghts that places substantial restrictions on 
police activity, why could you not have passed a statute that placed exactly those same restrictions 
on police activity?"). 
40. See, e.g., PAUL LEWIS, AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES IN LATlN AMERICA 204 (2006) (Marxist 
Allende's attacks on the court in Chile); MARC LINDER, THE SUPREME LABOR COURT IN NAZI 
GERMANY: A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS 15-31 (1987) (Nazi pressure on courts, which however 
never resulted in any dismissal or formal disciplining of a judge); PRILLAMAN, supra note 4, at 
113 ("[FJew democratically elected civilian leaders in Latin America in modern times did more to 
subordinate the judiciary to political influence [than Menem in Argentina]."), 139-40 (Allende 
undermined courts, but Pinochet did far more damage without intervening directly in internal and 
administrative autonomy of courts); Castaldi, supra note 10 (removals of judges by Chavez re~ 
gime in Venezuela go beyond reasonable campaign against judicial corruption and constitute cam-
paign to intimidate court); Derek Matyszak, Crearing a Compliant Judiciary ill Zimbabwe, 2000-
2003, in ApPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDIC1AL POWER 331 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. 
Russell eds., 2006); Rosenn, supra. note J 0, at 24 (Cuba formally abrogated judicial independence 
after Castro_revolution, subordinating courts to executive), 
41. See supra text accompanying note I. 
---------------------_._--
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over the judges. The historical sketcbes in section IV suggest that even 
among the Western countries where the rule of law ideology originated, 
political influence over judges has continued to be important. This is clear-
est in view of the admittedly political methods of judicial selection in the 
United States, but also in the long time that it took for France and Great 
Britain to adopt any structural protections for their judiciaries. Indeed, the 
persistence of political influeuce over the judiciary in these countries makes 
sense because all of them are, after all, well-consolidated democracies with 
competitive elections. While democracies may vary significantly with re-
spect to the degree to which they accept law as a limitation on the power of 
the elected branches of government, none of them can deny the importance 
of politics. Democracy today generally means giving great importance to 
competitive electoral politics. Rule of law ideology has to accept that 
judges have some degree of political responsibility and are subject to some 
degree of political influence if the judicial system is to be compatible with 
democracy. When the rule of law calls for judicial independence, it thus 
should not call for absolute independence, but rather for some reasonable 
balance between independence and political responsibility42 Since this is 
not a paper on institutional design, my only point here is that any design of 
the office of the judge that completely eliminates either side of the balance 
between independence and political influence is problematic. I do not advo-
cate great political control over judges, but I do suggest that rule of law 
advocates have to be willing to accept some modest measures of political 
influence that do not completely undermine the claim that the judges are 
free to decide each case before them according to the law ane! not according 
to politics.43 
The ancient Chinese debate also underlines the importance, for the 
concept of law as we understand the term in the West, of equal treatment 
and a certain ability and willingness to treat individuals in an abstract or 
impersonal manner that ignores family and clan relationships or personal 
rank or status. While the Legalists' program "shared the Confucian concept 
that ranks and duties must be clearly differentiated, it insisted that laws 
must be applicable to all,"44 and this insistence conflicted seriously with the 
dominant Confucian ideology, which was based on respect for family, rela-
tionship, and rank. Not all ideologies :hat privilege politics over law are 
necessarily based on respecting social inequalities. Many in fact profess 
egalitarian ideologies. Certainly that is the case with communism. And it 
must be conceded that systems that rely on law can just as easily enforce 
42. See authorities cited SIIpra \1ote 17. 
43, For additional discussion of the limits within which the appropriate balance has to be 
found, ~ee injra note 169. 
44. SOURCB BOOK, slIpm note 23, at 252; see also HEAD & WANG, supra note 23, at 50; 
WALEY, slIpm note 23, at 170 (Legalists' program was to eliminate hereditary privileges and grant 
preferment only for distinction in war). 
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social inequalities, But the Legalists appear to have formulated a claim that 
would resonate with modern Western legal systems, the notion that law 
should apply equally to all people, without regard to who they are or what 
political or social clout they may have, Without trying to turn the idea of 
law into a full-blown constitutional principle of equal treatment, it seems 
fair to say that the notion of law held by the Legalists, like that underlying 
modern Western law, is associated with a belief in some kind of minimal 
level of equality that has to do with equal and impersonal application of the 
law,,\5 We will recur to these points in section III's discussion of Islamic 
law. which will provide further insight into the role that equal treatment and 
impersonal or abstract treatment of people play in modern Western legal 
systems, 
At this stage in the argument, it is important to see the way these val-
ues are related to both strengths and weaknesses of systems of political 
morality, Such systems are freer to ignore issues of equality, The Con-
fucianists preferred morality to law precisely because it allows a thoroughly 
person-specific kind of reasoning. To them, this was more "human" than 
relying solely on a legal rule to be applied rigidly to all situations that can 
be subsumed uncler its terms because it allowed them to take into considera-
tion the full personal situation, including family, rank, and status, of each 
human being,46 But an official making decisions based primarily on politi-
cal morality, not on law, has an enormous 3lnount of discretion. That fact is 
not troublesome if you have great confidence in the people making the deci-
45. Cj David M. Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise a.fCapitalism, 1972 W1S. L. REV. 
no, 727 (1972) (describing the notion of "legal ratio:1aJity," a cOllcept which Weber thought most 
strongly exemplified by continental European legal systems, as "the degree 10 which a legal sys~ 
1em is capable of formulating, promulgating, and applying universal rules"). Weber classified 
traditional Chinese law as a form of "substantive irntionalily" because it involved "judging per-
sons according to their concrete qualities and in terms of the concrete situation, or according to 
equity and the appropriateness of the concrete result." ld. at 733 n.22 and accompanying text. 
CurioLlsly, he referred to this aspecl of Chinese law as "Kadi-juslice," referring to the qadi or 
judge-figure of traditional Islamic law. See infra section III(A). For a discussion of how Wes-
terners, including Weber, have mischaracterized the law-finding process in Islamic courts, see 
ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY Of' JUSTICE, supm note 20, at 58-79, nnd for a summary of the way in 
which qadi couns find law, see infra section HI(D). The discussion there of the personalism of 
Lraditional hilamic law will reveal a legal system in which equal application of the law held a 
rather different meaning than it does in Western legal :;yslems. 
46. Creel says that Confucian-clominated Chinese :;ociety (speaking generally of dynastic 
Chinese society and specifically of Ch 'jng rQing] era China in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries) was a "much more 'human' society than ours." RG. CREEL, CHINESE THOUGHT FROM CON-
FUCIUS TO MAO TSE-TuNG 240 (l953). By contrast, he wrote that we in the West 
Ie!. 
tend to dehumanize people, make them cogs in machines, move them about like pieces 
on a checkerboard. If they perform their jobs to the satisfaction of their superiors, well 
and good; if not, they are discharged. In China a whole series of relationships had to be 
taken into account, including customary rights and privileges. If the law of the Jand and 
the customs of a guild came into conflict, the courts woulcl sometimes rule in favor of 
the guild. Even the prices of commodities were negotiated in each instance between 
buyer and seller, so that a man with a winning personality ancl the gift of bargaining 
could buy much more cheaply than a Jess talenteJ;t competitor. 
-----------------------------------
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sions, and in Confucian theory, the officials should all have been educated 
and examined thoroughly on the Confucian classics and therefore morally 
"superior" men. But their qualifications notwithstanding, a system that 
gives priority to governance by politics is inevitably a system of rule by 
men. Unlike a system that relies primarily on politics, a system based on 
law tends toward the articulation of a set of rules that purport to cabin the 
discretion of the decision maker precisely because they use objectively de-
fined categories. Law's use of a technical, impersonal method may suit it 
better to limiting arbitrary decisions by government officials than political 
morality4? Certainly the arguments to counter contemporary movements 
that preach reliance on political control and persuasion rather than on law 
have to be based in large measure on this argument. 
A final point of the Chinese debate's relevance for modern legal sys-
tems has to do with the nature of the chief threat to judicial independence. 
Because a system of judicial independence has to make room for some as-
pects of political responsibility and int1uence in a modern democracy, it is 
the political leadership in the other two hranches-the "political" 
branches-who can be expected to pose a continual threat to judicial inde-
pendence. Moreover, as between the legislative and executive branches, to-
day it is the executive that is better suited to serve as a main vehicle for 
political oversight of the courts. Both the legislature am! the executive are 
chosen in political processes that make them suitable representatives of ma-
jor political forces, but the executive, usually a single-headed," hierarchical 
body with a large staff, is better organized to supervise others and to project 
political leadership than the legislature, which is a collective body with a 
large membership and a relatively small staff49 Small wonder, therefore, 
that, as the history canvassed in section IV will show, at least since the 
development of the modern executive branch in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, political oversight over judges has tended to come in its 
most threatening form from the executive branch. The long-term tendency 
for the executive branch to dominate :he courts is the function of both the 
tension at the heart of the rule of law between law and politics and the very 
different institutional structure of the two "political" branches. 
47. In his brilliant and critical portrait of Ming Dynasty government, Ray Huang illustrates 
this point repeatedly. See, e.g., RAY HUANG, 1587, A YEAR OF No SIGNIFICANCE: THE M[NG 
DYNASTY IN DECLINE 143, 149,210 (1981). A modern Chinese writer seems to echo this idea 
when he writes, "A society needs courts precisely because courts can tllm the solving of compli-
cated problems into a technical, institutionalized, and legalized procedure, and thus muinmin the 
stability and uniformity of the legal system." Xin Chul1ying, Whm Kind ofJlldicia/ PVH'er Does 
China Need?, 1 INT'L 1. CONST. L 58, 71 (2003). 
48. There are some multiheaded execlltiw branches, as in Switzerland, but these are not 
commoo. MATTHEW SOBERO SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDE~TS AND ASSEMBl.lES: CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 78, 96-101(199'1). 
49. For an elegant discussion of this point, see Charles L Black, Jr., The Working Balance of 
the American Political Deportllll!nts. I HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13 U 97+), 
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If the executive branch in a modern democracy is the chief counter-
weight and threat to judicial independence, then in order to foster the cul-
ture that favors reasonable levels of judicial independence, we need to find 
a political dynamic that would create support for the adoption of substantial 
institutional protections for the judges, limiting the executive's ability to 
control or influence the judiciary unreasonabJy, I advance the. transforma-
tive law thesis because I think it does precisely that. Before explaining that 
thesis, it will be helpful to be clear about what I mean by "transfonnative 
law," 
Much law is intended to enforce the status quo, but transformative law 
is intended to change society. Contemporary examples from U.S. law in-
clude Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimina-
tion in the job market on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national 
origin,5o or the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discrimi-
nation against the disabled in employment, but also in public services, ac-
commodations, and telecommunications 51 In both cases, supporters of the 
legislation had no doubts that there was discrimination against the class of 
people they intended to heJp. The Jaw was not passed to confirm social 
practice but to provide a legal basis for enforcement action designed to 
change social behavior. Of course, the hope always is that the mere enact-
ment of the law, or at least the threat of enforcement, will be sufficient to 
secure widespread voluntary compliance, but the point is that transforma-
live law is adopted for the purpose of effectuating societal change. 
A. Traditional Islamic Law 
My basis for thinking that the concept of transformative law might be 
connected with judicial independence starts with an intriguing observation 
by Lawrence Roseu about traditional Islamic law.51 I am interested in Is-
50. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2005). 
51. Americans with Di.-;abilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2005), 
52. I follow the scholars cited in this paper in refelTing to "Islamic law" or "traditional Is-
lamic law" as the legal tradition based on Islam (the sh(/tio) which was produced by Muslim 
jUlists in Muslim lands during the peliocls of rule by Muslim rulers and largely formed before the 
time of European colonization, which started chiefly in the nineteenth century, except in India, 
where it started earlier. That tradition spans a huge geographic area-from Morocco in the West 
to Indonesia in the East, and up into central Asia and down into Africa at least as far as Nigeria 
and Tanzania-and long timelines-from the time5 of the Prophet in the seventh century AD until 
now. The sharia itself bas also been marked by the major diVision between Sunni and Shia, and 
each of those tl'aclitions has for some centuries been divided into at least fOlif main schools. See H. 
PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 179-83 (2000). 
Generalizations about such a varied tradition might reasonably be held suspect. It might seem 
especially problematic to base generalizations about traditional Islamic law on practices of present 
day shari a courts in view of the pervasive contact between Muslim countries and modern Western 
---------------------------- --- - -- .-------
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lamic law as another sophisticated, non-Western legal tradition that did not, 
in general, develop any structural or institutional protections for the inde-
pendence of their judge-figure, the qadi,53 Professor Rosen's description of 
how Islamic law has been applied in the qadi courts54 of Morocco suggests 
legal traditions since at least the nineteenth century, and arguably much earlier. Nevertheless, 
scholars have noted great commonalities within the Islamic legal tradition, especially on systemic 
matters like the roles of lawyer and scholar, methods of legal interpretation, methods of evaluating 
proof, and so fOrlh. See ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY Of' JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 6 (arguing that the 
court in Sefrou, Morocco, was, at the time he observed it, typical in many essential ways of 
Islamic courts generally), For an extended but cautious argument that there are substantial conti-
nuities and common features in the various forms of Islamic law, and indeed of all the legal 
traditions that mb shoulders in the Middle East, see Chibli MaHat, From is[((mic to Middle East-
ern Law: A Restatement oj the Field (pts. 1 & 2), 51 AM. J. COMPo L. 699 (2003), 52 AM. 1. COMPo 
L. 209 (2004), 
53. In traditional Islamic law, the caliph or sultan generally appointed the qadi, who was 
considered his agent and served at his pleasure. DAVID F. FORTE, STUDIES IN ISLAMIC LAW: 
CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ApPLICATION 20 (1999); MaHat, supra note 52, 52 AM. J. COMPo 
L. at 210. The ruler's arbitrariness was somewhat limited, at least in the Morocco studied by 
Rosen, by the fact that he generally could not appoint someone as judge unless he had qualifled 
through study in a mosque-university taught by learned scholars (m~ifti), and the status of the 
scholars and the judges they trained as special guardians of the holy law undoubtedly gave them 
some sense of autonomy. See ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 65. But the 
traditional system, even though it did develop a I:;ophisticated doctrine of sources of law and 
extensive written legal scholarship on all aspects of the shari a, never developed any institutional 
protections for the legal offices of judge ur legal schular. 
Rosen tells a story from Morocco that illustrates the very limited autonomy traditionallegaJ 
officials could expect: The Sultan's local administrator tried to force the local qadi to register land 
the administrator had coerced from local owners, contrary to the sharia. The qadi resisted and fled 
just as the administrator was about to seize him. The enraged administrator seized the local relig-
ious scholars and threw them in jail instead. The new qadi registered the land. But locally impor-
tant figures refused to recognize the new qadi, sent a delegation to the Sultan, and persuaded him 
to remove the administrator to the Sultan's camp for a period of "enforced rethinking." Id. at 62. 
Traditionally, there was also no body of prcfessionallawyers to represent the parties in litiga-
tion. Mallat, supra note 52, 52 AM, J, COMP, L. at 210. 
The situation was not much changed by colonial occupation by France and the subsequent 
development of a Moroccan state after liberation. The qadis observed by Rosen were, like French 
judges prior to 1958, see infra section IV(B), "wholly dependent on the administrative hierarchy 
for advancement and placement," though Rosen did not think that the executive powers in fact 
exercised their power to control the qadis. ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 
63. 
I am grateful to Kim Lane Scheppele for reminding me that the Islamic law scholar, the 
nwjh, who might not only teach the future qadi at the mosque-universities where Islamic law was 
studied, but upon whose legal opinions the qadi might rely in deciding specific cases, had consid~ 
erably more autonomy. Like the Roman jurisconslllts, Islamic Jaw scholars held their offices pri-
marily by virtue of the recognition they earned from other scholars for their mastery of the law. 
Neither caliph nor sultan could control that process. As in Roman Jaw, it was the opinion of these 
scholars, not of the qadi, that cOllnted in determining what the law was on any given point. See, 
e.g., GLENN, supra note 52, at 165. The Islamic legal system thus had more autonomy from 
political power than might appear from the statement abollt the lack of protections for the qadi. 
Bllt see iJ!fm note 97 (arguing that this kind of@lonomy is not sufficient for transformative- law). 
54. The qadi courts Rosen observed were specialized chambers for family law and property 
cases for which the comt itself drew up the documents. The courts were \vithin a unified court 
system, so the qadis had to be competent to sit ill criminal or civil chambers. ROSEN, ANTHROPOL· 
OGY OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 10. But they 01.150 had been educated at the mosque-universities 
in sharia. hi. at 65. 
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to me that he sees Islamic law as lacking a concept of law as transformative 
in general, and in particular, as lacking a view that law is the proper tool to 
attempt to rectify society's inequalities. For example, he has wlitten that 
"Islamic law thus seeks neither to equalize whatever inequality exists nor to 
offer a preferred terrain for the reconstruction of society through judicial 
legislation."" Similarly, he has said, referring to Islamic law, "Nor does the 
law attempt, through a concept like the public interest, to offer itself as a 
preferred vehicle for the reconstruction of society."56 One might object that 
all law, to the extent it penalizes or imposes costs on human behavior in any 
manner, seeks to change behavior. For example, Islamic law establishes 
punishments that by modern standards seem quite harsh for six specific 
types of actions, the In/dud crimes, but these are actions which are con-
demned by the QUI" an itself and they therefore have long been taken by 
Muslim society to establish the outer bounds of behavior which is and must 
be proscribed. Enforcement of these rules may change the behavior of some 
social deviants, but society itself is not changed. Islam may have originally 
been intended to make some major changes in society, especially in the 
direction of increasing equality, and law, which lies at the heart of Islam, 
may have at times been meant to playa role in effectuating such changes. 
But over much of its history, and by the time Rosen observed it in qadi 
courts in Morocco in the latter part of the twentieth century, Islamic law 
apparently did not have, at least not to any great degree if I correctly under-
stand Rosen's observations, a view that making changes in law is a good 
way to transform society. 57 
This is a large generalization about a complex legal tradition of huge 
temporal and geographic dimensions, and we have been warned by recent 
scholars who come out of that tradition to be careful about sweeping gener-
alizations about Islamic law, especially if they are based on a notion of the 
legal exceptionalism of Islamic law. In other words, we have been warned 
not to fall into the orientalist trap of treating Islamic law as if it were some-
55. Id. at 79. 
56. !d. al 57. 
57. The six hudud crimes are adultery, non-conventional sexual practices, slander, lbeft, 
highway robbery, and apostasy. The Qur'an establishes the punishment for these crimes, chiefly 
by a set number of lashes or by stoning. AHMED E. SOLTAIAlA, CONTESTING JUSTICE: WOMEN, 
ISLAM, LAW, AND SOCIETY 37-38 (2008). 
Islam was meant in iLs original forl11 to change society. Huston Smith asks "whether history 
has ever witnessed a comparable moral advance among so many people in so short a time." 
HUSTON SMITI~, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 248 (991). For example, the sharia's limitation on 
polygyny to four wives at anyone time could be understood as an attempt to protect women from 
the abuses of unlimited polygyny, especially in light of the injunction to "deal justly" with each 
one. ld. at 252-53; SOUAlAiA, supra, at 51-52. I do not understand Rosen's observation to be an 
argument that Islamic law is incapable of embracing transformative law, only that it came to be 
incorporated largely in forms that did not include the concept. For an extended argument that 
Islamic law is open to reinterpretation in ways..thatwoulcl permit it to ameliorate women's status 
in Muslim societies, see id. -
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thing exotic and categorically different from other forms of law." Never-
theless, we have sound reasons to credit observations by Rosen, trained as 
an anthropologist and lawyer, about the practice of Islamic law in Morocco 
in the late twentieth century where he spent "many months stretching over 
nearly two decades"s9 observing the qadi courts and speaking with partici·· 
pants. One instance of the lund of legal system Rosen describes is sufficient 
for my purposes, for I am more interested in Rosen's observations for the 
light they shed by reflection on Western legal traditions, than what they 
mean for Islamic law, so I will leave it to more qualified scholars to debate 
the validity of Rosen's observation with respect to the whole of the Islamic 
legal tradition. 
In one respect, Rosen's statements are probably narrower than they 
might appear. I take Rosen's observations to be statements about the law 
that was being applied in the qadi courts whose jurisdiction was limited to 
family law and property for which the court had drawn up the relevant 
documents.6o These are matters that were primarily covered by sharia, the 
religiously based law that forms the core of what is usually meant by "Is-
lamic law,"61 and did not involve the law that had long been applied outside 
of the sharia, in special courts instituted by caliphs and sultans. 62 It is diffi· 
cult to find, at least in the West, studies of these other sources of law, and 
so it is not clear whether they also lacked transformative law, and I do not 
therefore assert that they did not. However, prior to the twentieth century, 
Islamic countries did not have representative legislatures with power to en-
58. Khaled Aboll EI Fadl, Soul Searching and the Spirit of Shari 'a: A Review of Bernard 
Weiss's The Spirit of Isiomic L£lH', I WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 553 (2002). 
59. ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUST!CE, supra Bole 20, at 5. 
60. Id. at 10. 
61. While shari a is not codified law, as sllch, il should be noted that in Morocco, the family 
law was codified in 1957 and 1958 in the Law of Personal Status or Mudm-vwww, which was 
based primarily on the Maliki school of shuria. There were some legislative reforms to that law 
over the years, but the most sweeping were in 2004. Yakare-Oule Jansen, Muslim Brides alld the 
Ghost of the Shari'a: Have the Recent Lull' Re/lJrJns in Egypt, TUllisia and Morocco Improved 
Women's Position ill Marriage and Divorce, and Can Religious Moderates Bring Reform and 
M(llce It Stick?, 5 Nw, U, 1. INT'L HUM. RTS. 181,202 (2007); see also Laura A. Weingartner, 
Comment, Family Law & Reform ill Morocco-The Mudmllan(l: j\llodemist Islwil and Women's 
Rights in the Code oj Personal StOWS, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 687, 692-97 (2005) (detailing 
the differences between sharia and the Mudawwana prior to the 200--1- reforms). That major reform 
was well after the publication of the books by Rosen on which I rely, so I think it is safe to say 
that the law applied by the courts he observed was essentially the Maliki school of sharia. 
62. FORTE, supra note 53, at 22-23 (describing tbe lIIa::.alim courts as a kind of equity juris-
diction beyond that of the sharia courts and rulers' "legislalion" as si)'asa which could be contrary 
to shuria); BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 186-87 (1998) (penal law, tax law, 
and law of war all fashioned by Islamic governments withoUL necessarily complying with shari a; 
law articulated in volumes ofJiqh (juristic writing Lbout sharia) and collections of fatwas (deci-
sions of jurists or councils of jurists in specific cases) counted as the "true" law of Muslim society; 
mazalim courts not bound by tlqh). But see Aboll El Fadl, supra note 58, at 563 (warning against 
the view, commonly expressed in Western literature about Islamic law, that Islamic law was "ju-
rists' law," studied and debated for theoretical or' religiolls reasons and not so much for its 
practicali ty). 
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act law, and many still do not. As I will argue below in section lIJ(B), while 
the Western legal traditions began developing the concept of transformative 
law before it adopted democratic legislatures, that kind of body is neverthe-
less a key component of the modern Western culture that promotes a belief 
in rronsformative law. It would not therefore be surprising if a society with-
out such a body also failed to develop a very strong belief in changing 
society through law'"' In fact, within the realm of Islamic law, the whole 
notion of legal change has undoubtedly been constricted, at least within 
Sunni Islam, where it has long been arguable, though not without contro-
versy, that no further development of sharia is possible.64 
B. The Contrast 'rith Western Law 
By contrast to traditional Islamic law, the Western legal traditions of 
civil and common law have both clearly embraced the concept of trans-
formative law and, as section IV will illustrate, also developed significant 
institutional protections for judicial independence. U.S. law, for example, is 
full of laws intended to change society, from the aforementioned Title VII 
and the ADA and other statutes that authorize victims or whistleblowers to 
sue as "private attorneys general"65 to the whole mass of explicitly regula-
tory law. 
63. I also argue iT~fra in ,;ection llI(B) that public law includes much lf3l1sformative law in 
tbe West. The degree to which Islamic law included public law appears disputed. Many Western 
writers state tbelt Islamic law had lillie public law, see, e.g., GLENN, supm nofe 52, at 193, but 
Abou El Fadl trikes Western scholarship to ta.'lk for implying that Islamic law had liltle and there-
fore was a pril11itive legal system. Aboll EI Fadl, supra note 58, at 564. In fact there is much 
agreement that Islamic law did include material on penal law, tax law, and even administrative 
law. See, e.g., id.; Mallat, supra note 52, 52 AM. 1. CaMP. L. at 223~33 (records for court in 
Tripoli from late seventeenth century include some criminal and administrative cases, in addition 
to private law cases, but no constitutional cases); WEISS, supra note 62, at 186-87. Pending clari-
fication of the nature of tbe public law involved in ,;haria, one cannot point (0 a lack of public law 
to support the claim. that Islamic law lacked a concept of law's transformalive role. 
64. Since the thilteenth centw)', many autborities within the Sunni schools of law have said 
that the "gates of tjtihad [legal reasoning] have been closed," a phrase which was understood to 
mean thut human jurists were no longer free to develop God's Jaw through human reason, Even in 
the Sunni schools, not everyone agrees, and certainly not in the Shia schools of law, which have 
never kno\\'n the closing off of ijtihad, FORTE, supra note 53, at 17,22-23; GLENN, supra note 52, 
at 178-87. Nevertheless, the contemporalY Islamic law scholar Ahmed Souaiaia argues, as a broad 
generalization about the Islamic legal tradition to date, that jU!ltice "was defined during, and did 
not evolve beyond, the formative period of Islamic law and practices (the first two Islamic centu~ 
des)." Unlike the Western view, in which justice is free to evolve as society changes, "[t]he 
Islamic religious concept of justice is locked." SOUI\IAIA, supra note 57, at 2. Such a view of legal 
change is certainly inconsistent with the concept of transformative law and provides further cor-
roboration that tram;fonnative law did not playa large role in traditional Islamic law. 
65. Statutes that harness the energy and self-:nterest of private parties as "private attorneys 
general" generally do so for the purpose of enhancing enforcement of transformative law. They 
typically provide for some financial incentive to sue, like the treble damage awards in antitrust 
suits under the Sherman Act, or the shifting of the successful plaintiff's attorneys fees to the 
defendant, contrary to the usual U.S. rule that each side bears its own costs of counsel. For exam-
ple, in NervlI1an v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S, 400, 401-02 (1968), a ca:ie brought by a 
prh'ate plaintiff against a private restaurant owner under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
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The trans formative view of law is basic to Western European legal 
systems, as well. Harold Berman has argued that each of the six great revo-
lutions which he claims mark the development of Western law-the Papal 
Revolution of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Protestant Reforma--
tion, and the English, American, French, and Russian Revolutions-have 
involved an initial 
interim period in which new laws, decrees, regulations, and or-
ders were enacted in rapid succession and as rapidly amended, 
repealed, or replaced, Eventually, however, each of the great rev-
olutions made its peace with the pre-revolutionary law and re-
stored many of its elements by including them in a new system 
that reflected the major goals, values, and beliefs for which the 
revolution had been fought. Thus the new systems of law estab-
lished by the great revolutions transformed the legal tradition 
while remaining within it.66 
The great codification movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
furnish clear examples of this kind of legislation adopted with the intention 
of changing societal relations after the revolutions of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries67 By that time, developing ideas of democracy in 
Western Europe included the idea of a representative legislature enacting 
laws, Once that idea is established, the process of enacting laws to change 
society seems to take on greater life, perhaps because the legislature, espe-
cially a democratically elected one, understands that it is called upon to 
which forbids racial discrimination in public accommodations, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, 
"[A] Title II suit is thus private in form only. Whe:1 a plaintiff brings an action. , . he cannot 
recover damage::;, If he obtains an injunction. he does so not for himself alone but also as a 
'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority." 
The Court said that Title II provided for the shifting of the successful plaintiff's attorney's fees to 
the defendant "to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief." Id. 
at 402. 
The Civil Rights Attorney':; Fees Award Act of [976,42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000), partially 
codifies the idea of the private attorney general by providing a statutory basis for recovery of 
attorney's fees by plaintiffs who successfully sue state and local governments. The Senate Report 
accompanying this legislation stated that the intent was to level the playing field so lllat even 
private citizens witb little money could serve as "private attorneys general" to bring these actions 
to enforce the civil rights laws, S. Rep. No. 94-101 [, at 6 ([976). 
66. BERMAN, supra note 34, at 29. 
67. Consider, for example, the way in wbich the nineteenth-century codes reformed lhe dvil 
law in order to eliminate feudal society and promote business tlnd bourgeois society. Sa, e.g., 
KONRAD ZWElGERT & HElN KaTZ, II\'TRODUCTION TO COMPARATlVE LAW: THE FRAMEWORK I 
82-85 (Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1987) (French codification). Shapiro nicely 
captures this idea in summarizing the views of Jeremy Bentham, the chief English legal philoso-
pher ,Issocialed with the nineteenth century codification movement: '"Law was not a set of external 
principles or hallowed rights. It was an instrument that, through the assignment of pleasures and 
pains, would move people to engage in socially de~irable activity," Shapiro, ludicict! Ilidepell~ 
dellce, supra note 21, at 627. See genemlly GLENN, Sl/pm note 52, at 135-43 (on the philosophic 
and social contexts of the ever increasing receptivity in the Western legal traditions (0 changc). 
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react to perceived problems,"" But even before the development of legisla-
tures, Western law revealed its tendency to use law to transform society, 
According to Berman, the Papal Revolution led to a process of reform in 
which the law in Western Europe was infused with Christian doctrine,"9 and 
the First Protestant or Lutheran Revolution in Germany taught that the rul-
ing princes had the responsibility to promulgate positive law to ensure 
righteons conduct and the common wea!.'o 
The concept of revolutionary law highlights some difficulties with the 
terminology of "transformative law," The ancient Chinese debate already 
raised the question whether law can ever be used to change society if soci-
ety is not already willing to change, I doubt that we shall ever have a defini-
tive answer to that question, but it is clear that law is a possible lever of 
power for those seeking to change a society, For purposes of the transform-
alive law thesis, I think it is only important that a substantial body of the 
public think that a given law could be an important tool for changing soci-
ety, Perhaps more critical for the transformativc law thesis is the problem of 
distinguishing transformative and nontransformative law, Strictly speaking, 
the incorporation of new values into law after society has adopted them is 
not really an illustration of transformative law, Law is transfonnative only 
when the enforcement of the law or the threat of enforcement has the power 
to change society because a substantial segment of society has not yet 
adopted the values of the law, Rut in the real world, it may often be difficult 
to distinguish these two cases, It is generally not clear when the revolution 
is over, but it usually has started before revolutionary law is adopted by 
statutes or court decisions, 
It is relatively clear, I think, that the decision in Brown v, Board of 
Education,7l for example, can be regarded as trans formative law because 
there were many public schools and other facilities throughout the Ameri-
can South set up under the principle of "separate but equal," which that case 
invalidated, But before that decision could be rendered by the Supreme 
Court, there was a substantial body of opinion, not only among human-
rights activists, but also among American political and governmental lead-
ers involved with U,S, foreign relations and military operations during the 
68. Cf, Shapiro, Judicial Independence, supra note 21, at 627 (in the nineteenth century the 
British Parliament reorganized itself to be capable of passing substantial new legislation, ancl the 
combination of the "Bcnthamite urge to create a new and rational body of law and the parliamen-
tary capacity to do so led to an enormous body of law reform"). 
69. BBRMAN, supm note 34 passim. 
70. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II 6-7 (2003). Examples of trans formative 
law are mOlit obvious with respect to spiritual matters, such as church liturgy, marriage, schooling, 
moral discipline, and poor relief, each of which was regulated by ordinances promulgated by 
secular authority in Protestant German lands during the sixteenth century with a mixture of radical 
change and elements of continuity. ld. at 179-92. 
71. 347 U,S, 483 (1954), 
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cold war that American law had to change on that point. 72 In the case of 
Title VII, it seems clear that activists for racial equality pushed for adoption 
of a statute in order to provide a legal basis to challenge what they saw as 
discrimination against racial minorities in the workplace.73 In the case of 
some other legislation, it may be much less clear whether the law is adopted 
to change society or merely to codify exi,ting practices, and some types of 
law, such as basic criminal and tort law concerning murder, probably reflect 
long-standing societal consensus in generaL7" However, even though there 
may be a number of' unclear boundary cases, [ believe there are enough 
clear examples of transformative law in the modern Western legal tradition 
to make the category useful. 
In fact, I would argue that much of public law is transformative law. 
Certainly much of constitutional and administrative law qualifies. Written 
constitutions are generally adopted to establish a new order, rarely just to 
confirm an already existing political order. They often call into being-that 
is, they "constitute"-new political and legal bodies. Perhaps the catalogues 
of human rights often included in constitutional documents are not always 
meant to be transformative, but they may become transformative as a result 
of specific interpretations they are given by the courts. As a result, we come 
to view constitutions as potential sources of transformative law, and the 
transformative parts of constitutional law are obviously hugely important. 
Rules of administrative law are transformative in that they establish new 
administrative agencies, regulatory powers, and proceedings or procedural 
rules that did not exist before. Substantive regulatory statutes and adminis-
trative regulations are among the clearest types of transformative law be-
cause they typically impose new standards of behavior on the regulated 
parties. 
While it may be correct that much of transformative law is public law, 
it would be incorrect to assume that private law cannot be. Legislative mod-
ification of private law rules is most clearly regulatory and hence transform-
72. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DE-
MOCRACY (200 1); THOMAS BORSTELMANN, THE COLD WAR AND THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN 
RACE RELATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA (2001). 
73. Francis 1. Vaas, Title Vll: Legisicltil'e Histor.v, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 432 
(1966). Title VU's inclusion of sex as a prohibited ground of discrimination provides an example 
of a legal rule that was passed even though it may not, by itself, have been supported by a legisla-
tive majority. It is clear that the amendment to add sex as a proscribed ground of discrimination 
was sponsored by an opponent of the bill's provisions on racial discrimination. Id. at 441-42. 
Perhaps he hoped by his amendmenl to scuttle the whole project. He was, in Hny event, unsuccess-
fuL The amendment was adopted in the House with liltie debate and also provoked little debate in 
the Senate, aside from an amendment to ensure that the provisions of the bill would not nullify the 
Equal Pay AcL. Id. at 441-42, 449-50. It is possible that the inclusion of sex was accepted by the 
legislative majority as part of the price of gaining the racial justit.:e that was the focus of the Title 
VII debate. If that is true, Title vn would furnish an especially strong example of transfol1native 
law insofar as it bans discrimination on the grounds of sex. 
74. Though the application of such law to certain cases, like the application of the crime of 
murder to abortion or enthanasia, may be quite controversial. 
--------------------~~------------
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ative, but even courts may modify private law rules for expressly regulatory 
purposes. For example, when the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the 
host liability rule," making social hosts liable for serving alcohol to their 
guests who were already visibly drunk if they then drove their cars and 
caused an accident, the court said it was doing so in order to mitigate the 
huge damages that drunk driving inflicts on society. The majority clearly 
intended by its ruling to change the behavior of social hosts in a significant 
way. Similarly, in the case which led the French Court of Cassation to adopt 
a fonn of strict liability for automobile accidents under the French Civil 
Code, Procureur General Paul Matter explicitly argued that departure from 
the traditional fault principle was necessary to "adapt in a liberal, humane 
spirit the text [of the Civil Code] to the realities and requirements of mod-
ern life. "76 
C. The Link Between Transformati!'e Law and Judicial Independence of 
Courts: Shapiro's Model for the Legitimacy of Courts 
The link between transfonnative law and jndicial independence from 
executive overreaching is based on Martin Shapiro's77 work on courts. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, Shapiro elaborated a model for exploring the issues of 
the legitimacy of courts in a comparative way. Although not designed for 
this purpose, his model provides a good basis for understanding how trans-
formative law is capable of generating support for judicial independence 
from the executive branch. According to Shapiro's theory, which I abbrevi-
ate here in order to focus on those parts of his argument which are relevant 
to mine, the basic sociopolitical logic of courts is that they have a triadic 
structure-two disputing parties and a neutral party acting as judge to re-
solve the dispute. This triad appeals to a universaJ sense of fairness. If the 
judge is neutral, each party has, at least in a formal sense, an equal chance 
to win. But the minute the jndge decides for one side, the fairness of the 
triad is broken. Now the model looks like two ganging up against the one 
loser. Shapiro argues that one way of solving this problem is to have the 
dispnting parties pick the judge, as they do in many arbitrations or media-
tions. It is harder for the loser to view the end-result of the litigation as a 
case of two ganging up against one if the loser helped pick the judge. An-
other way to prevent the triad from breaking down into a dyadic ganging up 
of two against one is to allow the judge to find compromise solutions that 
give something to each party. But leg.al rules are generally cast in binary, 
75. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A,2d 1219, 1224 (N.J. 1984); see also Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 
552,558 (Okla. 1979) (adopting rule for Oklahoma that informed consent standard requires physi-
cians to disclose all material risks to patient). 
76. Cour de cassation [Casso ch. n~uns.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction] Feb. 13, 1930, 
D.P. J 1930,57, Ripert, S. lur. I 1930, 121, Esmein, translated in part in ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 
& JAMES1r. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 629-31 (2nd ed. 1977). 
77. Shapiro is an eminen1 political scientist who has long taught on the Berkeley law faculty. 
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all-or-nothing terms: either the plaintiff has a right that should be vindicated 
by giving judgment for the plaintiff's whole claim, or he does not, and 
judgment has to be given for the defendant. The complexities of the way 
different legal rules intersect may permit the court to fashion a compromise 
result in some cases, but the whole logic of Western law is premised Oll 
binary logic. Official COUlt systems substitute "office" for "consent" --that 
is, the litigants are not free to pick their judge but must accept the judge 
appointed by the governing regime to hear their case. Office can substitute 
for consent, but only if the judge is independent and neutral with respect to 
both parties. If the judge's neutrality is suspect, the triad breaks down into 
the illegitimate dyad, throwing the court's legitimacy into doubt. Govern-
mental control over the courts is not problematic as long as the disputes 
resolved by the judge do not involve the government as an interested party. 
But when the government is interested in the outcome, it becomes impor-
tant to show that the judge is not controlled by the government if the court 
is to maintain any legitiluacy78 
In accordance with Shapiro's model, as the mix of legal cases coming 
before a given court begins to include !Dore cases in which the government 
is clearly interested, it should become clearer that dispute resolution by the 
courts will only be considered legitimate if the judges enjoy some kind of 
protection from executive dominance. Thus it appears that as the execu-
tive's stake in cases before the cuurts increases, a culture that supports pro-
tecting judicial independence from executive branch control can be 
expected to grow in strength. My claim is that in contemporary democra-
cies, much of trans formative law is law in which the executive branch has 
an obvious interest, so that instances of transformative law tend to have the 
function of highlighting the injustice of executive branch control over the 
courts. 
The point is easiest to see with respect to public law proceedings that 
may include transformative law because in many types of public law litiga-
tion, the government is formally a party. For example, the government is a 
party in all cases of judicial review of administrative action (suits for 
78. Shapiro, Judiciallndepelldence, supm note 21, al577-8J. Although the explanation in 
his 1977 article is sufficient for purposes of this paper, Shapiro has set out a much flliler explana-
tion of his theoretical mode! and its implication in SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 1-64. In the fuller 
treatment, Shapiro explores further complicating features of courts that put further strain on the 
triadic model of a courl. These features include lhe fact that courts engage in numerous adminis-
trative acts; that they can be seen as engaged in forms of social control that is based on notions of 
the public interest; that they are in effect dispensing a kind of public regulation, and cannot avoid 
making law: functions which lhrust the courts inevitably into politics and dictate that political 
forces must take control of the courts. 1d. at 20-32. His conclusion is thnt "courts remain problem-
utical in the sense that considerable tension invUliD.bly exists belween their l'undamelltal claims to 
legitimacy and their actual operations." ld. at 37. Shapiro's conclusion is peSSimistic and I do not 
mean to imply thtlt he would necessarily agree with my thesis about the power ot' trnnsforl1lutive 
law to shift the balance between political responsibility and independence of judges in the din~c­
tion of greater independence. 
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nondamage remedies like injunctions against and declarations of invalidity 
of government action). Cases challenging the constitutionality of statutes 
mayor may not involve the state as a formal party, but the executive branch 
is generally an interested party because judicial review of statutes on consti-
tutional grounds tcnds to raise issues of high political importance, in which 
political leaders in both political branches, legislative and executive, cannot 
avoid being interested. 
Other types of transformative law, including private law rules, also 
may not involve the government directly, but as in the case of judicial re-
view of legislation to which the administTation is not a formal party, the 
execntive is likely to have strong interests in litigation involving snch law 
becanse of the importance of the social policy at stake. Transformative law, 
law to change society, is by definition law that reflects social policy, and 
social policy is the stuff of politics. Litigation involving trans formative law 
thus inevitablY raises important political issues, so the executive cannot 
avoid being a concerned party. For example, a case brought by an individ-
ual against a corporate employer under the AD A for failure to make reason-
able accommodations inevitahly raises the general issue of how much 
society should burden individual employers in order to protect individuals 
with disabilities. The U.S. president can be expected to he quite interested 
in the general question, whether he or she favors business interests or work-
ers or is merely interested in the global competitiveness of the U.S. 
economy. 
But if transformative law is generally a kind of law in which the exec-
utive branch, headed by a major political leader, tends to have a clear inter-
est, is it not true that the executive may have a clear interest in the 
application of certain types of nontransfonnative law, as well? For example, 
nontransformative criminal law, like the basic rules against murder or roh-
bery, simply confirms social consensus that certain types of behavior must 
be punished. Nevertheless, in the person of the prosecutor, the executive is 
formally involved in every criminal case. Shapiro points out that the "weak-
ening of the triad [his model of court legitimacy 1 is clearest in criminal 
law."79 But does the participation of the executive in every criminal prose-
cution tend to create political concern over executive control over the 
courts? As a general matter, I think not. Sadly, few outside the targets of 
such ordinary, nontransformative criminal law-some activists and scholars 
at most-are likely to be concerned about executive influence on the courts 
in these cases, and the targets and their allies are unlikely to constitute a 
politically active or influential class that can help in building support for 
judicial independence. However, if criminal law is perceived to be em-
ployed as a method of oppression, perhaps on racial or religious grounds, of 
a certain segment of the popUlation, then the law is being used to transform 
79. SHAPIRO. supra note 17, at 27. 
------------_ .. -... -----------------------
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society, and if that segment includes politically active members, criminal 
prosecution can generate the dynamic in which I am interested. so 
Shapiro uses the term "public regulation" to describe the law that in-
vokes executive branch interests.'l I think he means much the same thing as 
I mean by "transformative law." I prefer my term chiefly because I think 
that public regulation is such a broad term that it could be taken to include 
nontransformative public law in which the executive branch really has no 
clear interest, but it might also be taken by some to exclude regulation that 
achieves its regulatory effect by shaping the rights of private parties against 
private parties, as in the case of the private rights of action under the anti·· 
trust laws, for example, or the other examples of private law previously 
mentioned. Shapiro's term is not necessarily inconsistent with the broader 
usage, but I believe that "transformative law" is less likely to be misunder-
stood in either of these ways. 
This article thus focuses on trans formative law because it has the po-
tential to mobilize political support for judicial independence. I am not, 
however, arguing that the presence of transformative law will necessarily or 
quickly result in the adoption of institutional guarantees of judicial indepen-
del1Ce. By my account, Western legal systems have long been developing 
transformative law, yet, as section IV will show, at least for France and 
Great Britain, substantial institutional protections for the judges' indepen-
dence were only adopted recently. My argument is only that over time, the 
more transformative law a society adopts, the greater is the social support 
for meaningful levels of judicial independence from the executive, and as 
that support grows, it becomes more and more likely that the country will 
adopt some kind of protections to curb undue executive int1uence over the 
courts if the country remains democratic. 
A more conventional thesis about this dynamic is that independent 
courts are promoted by the expansion of markets and the development of 
multiparty democracy.82 The transformative law thesis is not necessarily 
80. Note. in this connection, Shapiro's argument that the burglar subject to prosecution for 
burglary may deny or excuse his coodLict in various ways, but he is unlikely to argue that there 
should not be a law against burglary, which is why I do not regard the law against burglary as 
transfonnative. "It is precisely because [the burglars] perceive the law to be legitimate and the 
judge obligated to enforce it that they know he is not a neutral third but a ti'iend of the prosecu-
tion." ld. My assumption is that, absent a strong element of politiciziltion due to a perception that 
enforcement of sllch law amounts to group oppression on grounds like class, race, or religion, the 
burglars of the world normally stand before the criminal courts withoLlt many polilically active 
friends. However, if criminal enforcement is politicized, as it arguably is in many countries, espe-
cially where there are strong cleavages along the litles of race or religion, then arguably criminal 
law is being applied in a transformative way to chatlge the balance of power. 
S!. Id. 
82. See, e.g., JEI''iNIFER A. WIDNER, BU1LDlNG THE RULE OF LAW 307, 394 (2001) (sllmmariz-
ing thought of Francis NyalaJi. Tanzanian Chief Justice, [976-2000); (j: J. Mark Ramseyer, The 
PIt-;.::Jing (llljdepelldeJlce of Courts: A COlllparatif'e APPI'l)(ICIt, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 722 
{[ 994) (realistic anticipation that party in power may lose next election is what keeps all parties in 
ftlvor of independence of judges; better a neutral judiciary at all times than one controlled by 
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inconsistent with this conventional wisdom, but it offers a somewhat better 
explanation of the dynamic. The conventional thesis argues that with the 
growth of multiparty, competitive democracy, politicallcaders come to see 
that they need a neutral court to resolve election disputes and other matters 
concerning competitive politics in a fair way. Courts dominated by the po-
litical party controlling the executive are obviously unfair. Similarly, the 
argument is that as the market economy expands, business leaders see the 
need for neutral courts to resolve their disputes. The argument based on 
competitive elections is essentially a narrow version of the transformative 
law thesis because election law is a type of public law that is transformative 
in the same way that most regulatory law is-it establishes and enforces a 
set of rules that did not exist before the law in question was adopted, and its 
rules are clearly politically salient. The argument based on markets is over-
broad by comparison with the transformative law thesis. It is clear enough 
wby business leaders would be concerned about the fairness of executive-
dominated courts handling disputes between the government and busi-
nesses, but most of those disputes will also generally involve some form of 
transformative law because these dispntes have to do with law adopted to 
change business practices. To that extent ~he two explanations are essen-
tially identical. But it is not clear why business leaders would be concerned 
about the fairness of executive-dominated courts in the case of commercial 
disputes among businesses or between businesses and consumers if the law 
concerned is not transfoflnative. The trans formative law thesis thus largely 
covers the same cases as the alternative one. It provides a clearer explana-
tion of the dynamic involved than a thesis based on the development of the 
market economy would, but it is broader than the thesis about democracy 
and markets because it is not limited to conunercial disputes or election 
law. The transfoflnative thesis recognizes the way in which general regula-
opponents when you are out of power). Strictly speaking, Ramseyer's thesis is abollt why politi-
cians might abstain from interfering witll the courts, not abouL why a segment of the electorate 
would favor independent courts, but presumably in a democracy the preferences of elected leaders 
and their supporters should be similar. Ramseyer's thesis is thus the electoral half of the more 
general conventional thesis that combines an explanation based on ejections with a market-based 
explanation, 
Landes and Posner advance a theory that is very close to tne transformative thesis. They 
argue that interest groups in a democracy tend to favor an independent judiciary (0 enforce the 
legislative "deals" the interest groups are able to secure through legislation. William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judicim:v in Gn Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & &ON. 
875, 879 (1975). While the transformative thesis does not use the terminology of legislative 
"deals," the two theories are similar in lhat both of them postulate that support for judicial inde-
pendence from the executive comes from groups of voters who are concerned that the executive 
might use its power over judges to frustrate the intent of legislation about which they care. In 
Landes and Posner's theory, the legislation in question is legislation in which the interest groups 
were able to secure certain advantageous terms (the "dea!"), and in the transformative thesis, the 
legislation is some kind of law adopted to transform some aspect of society. Since the legislation 
tI:!.!lJ .c~n be the subject of legislati¥e "deals" in lhe Landes and Posner theory is generally some 
kind of regulatory law, the two theoJies are essentially addressing tile same kind of legislation. 
~~ ____________ • _____________ ~~~ _____ --~ ___ ---__ - __ 0'-
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tion, constitutional and administrative law, and even the development of 
tort law doctrines like the social host rule, the informed consent rule for 
medical care, or slander and defamation rules for elections may contribute 
to the dynamic favoring judicial independence. 
The transformative thesis is not meant to be exclusive. There certainly 
are other sources of a dynamic that might also favor the development of a 
culture of judicial independence. Probably the most important of these is 
the pressure exerted on a country by foreign trade and investment. The ar-
gument is that a country desirous of obtaining substantial levels of foreign 
trade and investment is under pressure to provide independent courts to 
guarantee the foreign traders and investors a neutml forum for the resolu-
tion of trade and investment disputes. That mechanism could operate inde-
pendently of the dynamic created by transformative law, and the fact that it 
might appear to be the chief factor leading a particular country to establish 
meaningful protections for their judges in certain circumstances would not 
show that the transformative thesis is false. It would only show that it may 
not be the only explanation. However, the need for neutral courts for inter-
national trade can be satisfied by special trade courts or arbitral bodies for 
international trade and may not necessarily lead to greater independence for 
the regular courtS.83 This mechanism therefore does not appear as likely to 
be useful to reformers, especially domestic reformers, seeking to increase 
judicial independence, Nor do other theories seem as promising a source of 
reform strategies as the transformative law thesis. 84 
83. In modern China, the government has responded to the pressUI'e of international trade by 
eSlablishing a Chinese arbhral body fOf foreign trade disputes, China International Economic & 
Trade Arbitration Commission ("CIETAC"). China did so in part because of recognition that its 
regular judiciary was considered too likely to be intluenced by provincial bureaucrats to favor 
Chinese interests over foreigners. JINGZHOU TAO, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA xiv 
(2004). Whether CIETAC has successfully established a more independent body for dispute reso-
lution is not entirely clear. It has become the international arbitration institution with the largest 
caseload in the world, a factor which could indicate a degree of Sllccess but one that also could 
simply be attributed to the volume of foreign trade and invesLment involving China. In fact, since 
1995, CIETAC has had a steadily declining caseload. Id. at 29-30. In any event, there does not 
appear to be any evidence that CIETAC bas affected the continuing lack of independence that 
characterizes the regular Chinese judiciary. Xin, supra note 47, at 69-71. 
More direct pressure may come from international agreements, of which the WTO is un~ 
doubtedly the strongest exumple. See, e.g., Quang Nguyen, The Orgallisation alld Operation (l 
Admil1i.l'fmrive Cou/'ts in Vierfl(un, ill ASIA EXAMINED: PROCEEDINGS OP THE 15TH BmNNI.A.L CON-
FERENCE OF THE ASAA, 2004, CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA 27 (Robert Cribb ed., 2000.\.), (ll'£liltlble (It 
htl p:1 Icaa m bs . an ll.ed u. au/S peei alPro j/ AS A Albie n n i a [-co n ferencel2004/ procee dings. h tm I (U .S .-
Vietnamese Trade Agreement requires Vietnam to mnke its judges independent). 
84. It has been argued, for example, that judicial independence is promoted by true separa-
tion of powers between the legislative and the execut ve branches and that it declines to the extent 
that the execlltive increases ils conlrol over the legii;iature. MeNaHga...:t, COllditions for Judicial 
independence, 15 J. CONTErvIP. LEGAL ISSUES 105, 108-109 (2006); Tiede, slipm note 1, at 
150-52. The collective of authors known as "MeNoligast" have argued that the thesis fits the 
development in the United States very well and also fits data from Argentina, Mexico, and Chile. 
McNollgast, supra, at 126. It seems right in the sense that a president who is able to dominate the 
legislature is unlikely to be willing to be resu;cted by courts ind~pel1dent of his or her power. But 
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D. Values Related to Tran~t'o/'ll1ative Law: Personalism and Equality 
Lawrence Rosen makes one other intriguing observation about the so-
ciety in which Islamic law has traditionally been applied which I believe to 
be related to the absence of transformalive law and which also may be rele-
vant to significant parts of Latin American societies. The Arab" societies 
he has studied, Rosen says, are characterized by intense personalism86 The 
core of that idea is that personal qualities, or what in the West would be 
thought of as aspects of a person's character or psychological makeup, are 
for traditional Arab thought "aspects of social identity that mean something 
only as they cohere in a named individnal. In every domain the attribution 
and assessment of others consists of a never-ending process of individua-
tion."87 The cultures may be worlds apart, but the Confucian insistence on Ii 
seems similar to the Arab form of personalism insofar as it requires dealing 
with each person differently, depending on that person's relationships, sta-
tus) and rank. 
The Arab insistence on "the individual as embodiment"88 has conse-· 
quences for the view of the self: 
the thesis also suggests that in true parliamentary systems, in which the executive often largely 
controls the legislative branch, judges should not have substantial levels of independence, a pre-
diction at odds with what section lY(e) suggests to be the case in Great Britain after the most 
recent refonns. The recent strengthening of protections for judicial independence in France, see 
il(fra section IV(B), also provides a contrary example because the exe-cutive in France has even 
more control over the legislature than is tbe case in Great Britain. See John Reitz, Political Eco/l.-
om .... ' and Separmioll of Powers, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 579, 602-608 (2006). 
Finally, I l11ustmention Hiram Chodesh's creative suggestion that court systems may consti-
tute a type of "emergent" system capable of organizing itself and even solving problems without 
any master plan or architect. Chodesh, supra note 2, at 591-94. Perhaps he only means to make a 
plea for fhe sharing of information and collaborative vmrk on judicial reforms, but the analogy to 
emergent systems suggests a view that legal sy~tems have the potential 10 work out reasonable 
solutions to their problems without any conscious, guiding force. Chodesh does not suggest any 
specific mechanism, but the transfol'm3tive law thesis does. As governments increasingly adopt 
transformative Jaw~and they tend to do so in order to deal with problems of industrial and post-
industrial society~the political suppOli for curbing unreasonable degrees of executive control 
over courts ollght to increase so that it becomes more and more likely that the country will adopt 
and enforce sLlch c-urbs so long as it remains a democ:acy and does not concentrate power unduly 
in the executive. I am not sure that such a process is inevitable under these conditions; I maintain 
only that it is likely. 
85. Rosen's observations are based on his work in Morocco, which contains a large and 
dominant Arab population, but also a lurge Berber population. He uses the term "Arab" in discuss-
ing personalism, ROSEN, supra note II, at 56-72, but of course tbe term is not coterminous with 
all Muslims. My purposes are served by accepting the validity of his description of the qadi courts 
he observed in Morocco. I leave it to Middle Eastern experts to debate the validity of his observa-
tions for other places where Lslamic Jaw is applied. 
86. See generally ROSEN, ~;upra note 11, at 56-72 (chapter entitled "Constructing Institutions 
in a Political Culture of Personalism"); ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 54, 
69,79. 
87. ROSEN, ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 54. So Rosen says, quoting an 
unnamed writer, "for the Arab) history if) biography." /d, ____ " __ 
88. !d. 
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[1]n Arab culture the self is not divisible as in the West, and. __ as 
a result one cannot speak of a series of roles which somehow 
stand either separate from that which is properly called the self or 
which can be taken on, as masks of the self, allowing thc per-
formance of tasks that may contradict other aspects of one's over-
all identity."9 
For that reason, "[i]llstitutions are attributes of the person, not the other way 
around; they are the garments one may wcar, not as part of a distinguishable 
role or pcrsona, but as part of one's overall attributes."9o Institutions in the 
Arab world thus cannot have the same impersonal sense that they have in 
the West, and as one symbol of this difference, Islamic law "has no concept 
of the legal person."91 
Personalism affects the whole judicial process, as Rosen illustrates 
with a story. When he tells his legally knowledgeable informants in Mo-
rocco about cases in the United States in which Supreme Court justices 
indicated in their opinions that they were ruling in the case in accordance 
with what they thought the law required even though their personal feelings 
would lead them to a contrary result, the Moroccan informants protested 
that he must have left OLlt part of the story that would show why they ruled 
as they did. Rosen's informants simply could not accept that an officeholder 
like a judge could compm·tmentalize his thinking to act in accordance with 
the dictates of his office even if contrary to his personal sense of jnstice.92 
Personalism also makes the whole trial process in Islamic courts quite 
different from that in Western courts. It has been described as a "law-find-
ing trial[.] .... one in which all cases may be seen as different and particu-
lar. and for each of which the precisely appropriate law must be carefully 
sought out. The law of each case is thus different from the law of every 
other case .... "93 Rosen explains that the qadi's freedom to consult differ-
ent law sources and stitch together a specific law for the specific case at bar 
results from the view that the trial is a "quest for the individuated."9-l In 
deciding the case, "the qadi articulates the outer limits of the requisite and 
forbidden [for example, the izudud crimes] and, heyond that, seeks not the 
89. ROSEN, supra note! l. at 67-68. 
~O. Id. at 71. 
91. /d ut 64 
92. It!. at 56-57, 7 L 
93. GLI~:\~, sapra note 52, at 163. It ~hOllld be noted that Islamic law nevcrthele~s does huve 
a concept of equul process in the application of [he law. Rosen reports Ihat his juristic informant:, 
were not troubled by the fact that the "law-t"int!ing trial" of Islamic law may result in different 
judgments for two ditTerent people with similar cases. First, they said, "smce no two indiviJulIb 
are c,\tLctly tht' sUint' no two L'a~es an; preci:-ely the same," ROSEN, ANTIIR()puLOCr OF h'STICE, 
slipm note 2(), ,It 7 .. 1-. t\1ore importantl), the) argued. "if the mode of <lnalysb and facl-finding is 
the same in each ellse lllthougil clilTerent judges may reach different conclusions, the results art 
equivalent bet:ml~e the pJ\}ce~s \\a~ identical." Id. <It 7-1-~75. According to thi~ aCC()UIlt, Islumic 1<1\\ 
seeks justice in equ:tI process to find the legal rules, not necessarily in equal ruks for every party. 
lJ-L RUSEt\, A:"!TlllWI'OL.OGY Uf' JUSTICE, .vI/tWO note 20. at 5-1-. 
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[l]n Arab culture the self is not divisible as in the West, and ... as 
a result one cannot speak of a series of roles which somehow 
stand either separate from that which is propcrly called the self or 
which can be taken on, as masks of the self, allowing the per-
formance of tasks that may contradict other aspects of one's over-
ail identity."9 
For that reason, "[i]nstitutions are attributes of the person, not the other way 
around; they are the garments one may wear, not as part of a distingnishable 
role or persona, bnt as part of one's overall attributes."90·Jnstitutions in the 
Arab world thus cannot have the same impersonal sense that they have in 
the West, and as one symbol of this difference, Islamie law "has no concept 
of the legal person."9! 
Personalism affects the whole judicial process, as Rosen illustrates 
with a story. When he tells his legally knowledgeable informants in Mo-
rocco about cases in the United States in which Snpreme Court justices 
indicated in their opinions that they were ruling in the case in accordance 
with what they thought the law required even though their personal feelings 
would lead them to a contrary result, the Moroccan informants protested 
that he must have left out part of the story that would show why they ruled 
as they did. Rosen's informants simply could not accept that an officeholder 
like a judge conld compartmentalize his thinking to act in accordance with 
the dictates of his office even if contrary to his personal sense of jnstice."2 
Personalism also makes the whole trial proeess in Islamic courts quite 
different from that in Western courts. It has been described as a "law-find-
ing trial[,] .... one in which all cases may be seen as different and particu-
lar, and for each of which the precisely appropriate law must be carefully 
sought ont. The law of each case is thus different from the law of every 
other case .... ""' Rosen explains that the qadi's freedom to consult differ-
ent law sources and stitch together a specific law for the specific case at bar 
results from the view that the trial is a "quest for the individuated.""" In 
deciding the case, "the qadi articulates the onter limits of the requisite and 
forbidden [for example, the hudud crimes] and, beyond that, seeks not the 
tj9. ROSEN, :i!lpm nOle 11, at 67-68, 
90. ld at 71. 
91. Ill. at 64. 
92. /d. at 56-57. 71. 
93. GLENN, supm Hule 52, at 163. It should be noted that Islumic law neverthcles:-, cloes have 
a concept of cqml1 pruce:-.s in the application of the law. Rosen reports that his juristic inrormanb 
were not troubled by the fact tbilt the "law-finding trial" or Islamic Jaw may n~sull in different 
judgmenl.S for two different people with similar cases. First, they said. "since no [\VO individuals 
are exactly the saille no two cases are precisely the same." RDSfc:N. ANTIlROPOUK1Y OF JUSTICE, 
.wpm note 20, at 7-1.. J\ime importantly. they argued. "if the mode of analysis and fact-finding b 
the same in each case although different judges may reach different conclusions, th~ results are 
equivalent becclllse the proce:-.s Web identical." {d. u[ 74-75. According to this account, Islulllic lav, 
seeks justice in t'qual process to find the legal rules, not necessarily in equill rules for every party. 
9-1.. ROSE"', ANT1-IIWI'OLOGY OF JUSTICE, s:lpm note 20, al 54. 
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each case apparently satisfies a deeply felt need for a highly personalist 
approach to human relations. But law cannot be expected to change society 
unless it can be applied, as we expect it to be applied in the West, with a 
logical consistency that is unaffected by who the parties are except to the 
extent that their relevant characteristics are specified in the law itself. For 
this reason, I believe that Rosen's observations about the personalism of the 
culture in which Moroccan qadi courts operate confirms my understanding 
of his work as indicating that the transformative view of law played little or 
no role in that culture 97 
Like the comparison with traditional Chinese law, the comparison of 
modern Western law with the form of the traditional Islamic legal system 
studied by Rosen thus highlights the importance for Western legal systems 
of a value we may take for granted in Europe and the United States but that 
is, I believe, tied to the commitment to transformative law. One of the mor-
ally attractive claims at the heart of both Confucian political morality and 
traditional Islamic law applied in the personalistic way described by Rosen 
is the claim to treat each individual as an individual, not as a cipher or a 
fungible unit characterized solely by whatever featllres are called out in the 
applicable law. By contrast, we can ap?reciate a cerlain willingness to treat 
humans in an "objective" or "abstract" or '~impersonal" fashion in our 
Western legal systems. However, in the West, this impersonal approach is 
seen more positively, as necessary for achieving the ideal of applying the 
law equally to all persons who come within its terms."" The willingness or 
ability to treat people in an impersonal way is thus linked to one aspect of 
the ideal of equality. 
The morally problematic side of Confucian political morality or, in-
deed, any system that relies primarily on politics, I have argued in section 
II(B), is a lack of technical controls to ensure the minimum degree of equal 
treatment inherent in the Western idea of law.99 I believe that similar risks 
inhere in the personalistic way that Islamic law is applied. If the law can be 
different for every case, then it is easy for legal results to be more favorable 
for those who carry advantages of family or clan ties or status or rank. 
Islamic law may not be as frankly nonegalitarian as Confucian law codes 
specifying different penalties for different classes. In fact, in some impor-
97. In \iew of the independent role the mufti or scholar pluyed in articulating the law, SI:'l' 
silpru notes 53 and 96, one might argue that transformativc law could have come from that source. 
but I find no suggestion that this was so. In an) event, the division of authority that left the qadi in 
charge or deciding concrete cases, baseu on the c:adi's fact finding and his stitching togelhel' the 
law for the case, Hncllhe mufti in charge of cklemlining rules of law in the abstract renders the 
mufti e\'cn ley:. able than tbc qadi to assnre the enforcement of transformative rult':s of law. In light 
or Ih~H division of fundion, it is not surprising that we find little or no mention of Iran~Jormatin': 
law in the blHIllic legal twdition. 
'J8. The tension between personalism and impersonalisl11 surfaces within Western law as 
\>,'cll, of cuur~e, as sbov,--n by the controversy over crimi nul .o.entcncing guidelines. 
99. Sr.'e supra tnt accomp<mying notes 45-47, 
---------------------.--.-~------ -
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tant ways Islamic law was quite egalitarian. 'oo But like Confucian-domi-
nated Chinese traditional society with its highly personalistic application of 
Ii, Islamic law appears to have been applied in a strongly personalistic way 
that made relationships and status and rank very important, arguably at least 
as important as the terms of law itself. Law that includes such strong forms 
of personalism cannot serve very effectively as a tool to transform society, 
especially in ways that seek to challenge the substantial social inequalities 
built into personalistic systems. Law in societies of personalism appears to 
be thought of as a tool that should conform to society more than as a tool 
for making society conform to it. 
E. The Apparent Weakness of Belief in Tronsformative Law and Values 
Associated with That View of Law in Latin America 
One might suppose that a belief in transformative law would permeate 
Latin American societies as I claim it does U.S. and Western European 
societies. After all, Latin America is part of the West and heir to the slow, 
steady development of transformative law in Western legal history to which 
I have pointed in section III(B). Latin America has elected legislatures, 
codes of law, and public law including constitutional and administrative 
law. In fact, Latin American law includes substantial examples of trans-
formative law, and I will suggest in section VeE) some strategies for work-
ing with that kind of law to promote greater judicial independence. But 
there are grounds for suspecting that confidence in the transformative 
power of law may be weak in Latin America. Keith Rosenn has described a 
culture of legalism in Brazil, in which laws are passed in great volume to 
solve specific problems but without any serious efforts to ensure enforce-
ment so that the law remains unenforced. lol Such a culture would obviously 
weaken any belief in transfonnative law. There are also grounds to believe 
that forms of personalism remain strong in Latin America and may also 
weaken cultural support for transfonnative law. 
One might suppose that the ability to deal with people impersonally 
and the ideal that law should be applied in an impersonal manner are so 
widely shared in the modern world that personalistic views of law like those 
Rosen describes are simply not relevant to modern society in Latin 
America. One might think that globalization and urbanization, both features 
certainly affecting Latin America, would have effectively reduced personal-
ism in Latin American society to the point of unimportance. However, we 
must remember that Rosen's descriptim of Arab personalism is based on 
his observations of contemporary sharia courts in Morocco. Personalism is 
100. See, e.g., Timur Kuran, The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Len\-': Origins and 
Persistence, 53 AM. 1. COMPo L. 785, 816 (2005) ("Islam's relatively egalitarian inheritance sys-
tem" required division of estates among all the heirs instead of the system of primogenitme that 
was more typical of the medieval Western tradition.). 
101. Rosenn, Brazil's' Legal Culture, supra note 14, at 19. 
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not a relic of the past and is undoubtedly a feature of all societies to some 
extent. In its most basic form, it simply represents the view that relation-
ships, status, and rank sbould be taken into account in dealing with other 
people. A form of personalism is found wherever ties of family, clan, tribe, 
or ethnic group can be expected to be very important in people's social 
dealings, and that may include most, if not all, human society. But forms of 
personalism are inconsistent with a culture of transformative law when they 
are strong enough that one cannot generally expect law to be applied ac-
cording to its terms if it conflicts with the treatment that one party owes 
another party or the judge owes the parties based on personal or family 
connections, or rank or status. 
There are reasons to think that personalism is still strong in Latin 
America. After the revolutions against Spain, the weakness of the newly 
independent governments led to civil war and caudillismo. As Mark Ungar 
explains, "[Elverywhere, provincial caudillos carved out personalistic re-
gimes with separate armies and governments." '02 Other authors have men-
tioned the continued existence in at least some parts of Latin America of 
this form of personalism (also called "clientelism") in which a leader (the 
caudillo or patrao) gives his followers protection and welfare in return for 
loyalty and service. l03 Like other forms of personalism, such a form of so·· 
cial and political organization makes certain people more important than 
others based on extralegal factors of relationship or status in a way that 
seems inconsistent with a view of law as rransformative. It could interfere 
with the kind of impersonal application of the law that is required for trans-
formative law and therefore appears to be an important aspect of the rele-
vant culture that reformers need to take into account. 
IV. HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRUCTURAL 
GUARANTEES FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES, FRANCE, AND GREAT BRITAIN 
In order to put some t1esh of actual facts on the bones of theory, this 
section reviews the history of the adoption of structural protections for judi-
cial independence in three Western countries, the United States, France, anel 
Great Britain. The three countries are not presented as ideal models. They 
102. UNGAR, supra note 3, at 23. 
103. See, e.g., LEWlS, supra note 40, at 14-15,27-29,246 (describing history and dynamic of 
caudillo strongmen in Latin America; in modem era of mass politics, caudillo becomes charis-
matic party leader benefitting his follOWing with renewable resources or state, jobs, contracts, 
welfare, and graft); 1m-IN PEELER, BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 105-37,200 (1998) 
(explaining modern forms of c{ludillismo in authoritarian regimes in Parguay, Mexico, and Cuba: 
continuing power of clientelis111 in age of democracy); See (ilso ROBERT L. GILMORE, CAUDILUSM 
AND M1LlTARISM IN VENEZUELA, 1810-]910,57-68 (1964) (tracing how caudillismo evolved into 
a more despotic presidential form in Venezuela); (.j: Rosenn, Brazil's Legc!l Culture, supra note 
14, at 14-15, 17-19 (discussing persoflalismo, by which he means "a strong sense of loyalty and 
obligation towards family and friends" and "the patrtio (patron) complex of traditional Brazil"), 
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are simply three concrete examples of Western countries that have by now 
adopted significant forms of institutional protections for its jndges. 
This history is reviewed here primarily to show the striking temporal 
correspondence, at least for these three countries, between adoption of 
structural guarantees for judicial independence and judicial review of legis-
lation, which I have argued to be an especially important source of trans-
formative law. This cOlTespondence arguably provides support for the 
transformative law thesis. The history also illustrates several points from 
the discussion in section II concerning the tension between politics and law 
at the heart of the rule of law ideology. First, at least for France and Great 
Britain, the adoption of structural protections for judges is surprisingly re-
cent,104 so even in the West politics have long trumped judicial indepen-
dence to a considerable extent. Second, the actual stnlctural protections that 
have been adopted have tended to leave room for some political influence 
in the selection of judges, thus confirming the conclusion in section II that 
the rule of law has to involve a balance between jndicial independence and 
political oversight or influence. Third, much of this history, especially the 
more recent history, shows a coneem primarily for executive dominance, 
which section II argued to be the most important counterweight or thrcat to 
judicial independence in modern democracies. After a subsection tracing 
the history for each of these countries, a concluding subsection will discuss 
each of these points. 
A. The United States 
The real beginning of institutional design to assure reasonable judicial 
independence from both executive and legislative control took place in the 
drafting of the U.S. federal constitution in the late 1780s. Control over the 
judiciary had actually long been an issue in the English-speaking world. 
One of the claims over which the Stuart kings of England clashed with 
Parliament concerned their claim to dismiss British judges whenever they 
pleased.")5 By the Act of Settlement in 1701 (effective in 1714), Parliament 
abolished the British king's right to dismiss judges but arrogated that power 
104. I confess to being surprised when I researched this history, and I am apparently not alone. 
See Landes & Posner, supra note 82, at 876 (arguing that Article III of the U.S. Constitution 
provides substantial independence to federal judges and then saying, "[tJo a Jesser degree, the 
same thing may be said of ... judges in many other cOlllltries, and, for lhat mauer, of judges at all 
levels, in America and elsewhere, long before Article III was conceived"), Section IY(A) below 
shows that Article m was really the first meaningful set of institutional protections against politi-
cal control over the judiciary. 
105. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 Oth ed, 1998); Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Separa-
ti01l QrPm1-'ers: judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 108, 110-11(970); MARY 
L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE LUCIENNE L,AFO:"-J, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE CRoss-EvOLUTION OF 
FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES 17-18 (1988); Shapiro, Judicial Independence, suprn note 21, 
at 620-21. More than other royal families in British history, the Stualts asserted claims to absolute 
power. 
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to itself, thus exchanging one judicial overlord for another. 106 The British 
king continued, however, to assert his right to discharge colonial judges at 
his pleasure, and the king's tampering with the courts became one of the 
particular grievances pressed by the colonists against the Crown at the time 
of the American Revolution. 107 
The U.S. Constitution was drafted on the heels of that history, and 
since its entry into force in 1789 and the creation of the lower federal judi-
ciary in the same year, the U.S. Constitution has provided the institutional 
protections that U.S. federal judges still enjoy today. U.S. federal judges 
must be selected through a system of checks and balances in which the 
president nominates, but the senate must approve by a majority. lOB The 
judges may not be discharged except by impeachment for serious misbe· 
havior, and their pay may not be reduced during their time in office.109 
These institutional provisions do not eliminate political influence. They use 
the system of checks and balances to let executive and legislative power 
check each other in the nomination of judges. But they also give the judges, 
once in office, the very substantial protection of lifetime tenure and security 
of pay. Of course, federal judges are subject to impeachment, but impeach-
ment has turned out to be a very blunt instrument of political control be-
cause it is so difficult to use. IIO 
While it may not be certain that the U.S. creation of institutional guar-
antees of judicial independence occurred in express contemplation of the 
106, Ervin, supra note LOS, l~t 111-12; Shapiro. Judicial Independence, supra note 21, at 
620-22. By rules which did not take effect until 1760, judges held their office qUClllldiu Sf! belle 
gesserit (during good behavior), but they also remained subject to removal from office by im-
peachment or a joint address of the houses of Parliament. Ervin, supra note 105, at tll-12, 
107. VOl.CANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 19; Ervin, supm note 105, at 112. 
108. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 states in relevant part that the President "shall nominate, 
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senne, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme 
Court." Lower federal court judges are not literally prolected in this manner by the U.S. Constitu-
tion, but in fact they are also appointed in this manner. ABRAHAM, supra note lOS, at 21. 
109. Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. ConstilUtion reads: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from tlme to time ordain and establish. The 
Judges, both of the suprem~ and inrerior Courts, shall hold their Offices dllring good 
Behaviour, and shan, at stated Times, receive I'\x their Services, a Compensation, which 
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. 
The Impeachment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Article II, Section 4 ("The President, Vice 
President and all civil Officers or the United Slates, shall be removed from Office on Impeach-
ment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."), does 
not literally apply to Article III judges, but the phl':lse "during good Behaviour" in Article In, 
Section 1, is taken to refer to the same mechanism. VAN-BOA To, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
242-46 (2006). 
110. To remove a federal judge requires impeachment by the HOLlse and conviction by two-
thirds of the Senate. Ser U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, d. 6. It ii:i "a very 
arduoLls process, both procedurally and substantively." To, .'iI/pm note 109, at 244. It is so ardu-
ous, in fact, lhat since 1789, only Lhirteen of the forty-seven impeachment cases opened against 
federal judges have proceeded to the Senate for trial, and only seven of those cases have resulted 
in a conviction. Id.; {ICCOJ'd ABRAHAM, S!lpnl note IDS, at 42-51. 
.~------~------------ --- ---
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introduction of judicial review of legislation, Marbury v. Modison III was 
decided only fourteen years after the Constitution entered into force, and 
already prior to and during the process of drafting and ratifying the Consti-
tution, some state courts had held state legislation invalid on the grounds of 
violation of the state constitution."" It seems fair to say that the idea of 
judicial review of legislation was "in the air" at the time the U.S. Constitu-
tion adopted very substantial structural guarantees of judicial independence. 
The fede[al system of structural guarantees of judicial independence 
has not been changed since 1789. But in the Jacksonian era's renewed em·· 
phasis on popular democracy, the states were swept by enthusiasm for elec-
tive methods of judicial selection, and despite continued experimentation at 
the state level, we can say as a generalization that the states today have 
various forms of popular election for fixed terms although a few states use 
purely appointive systems for judicial selection. "3 The most popular sys-
tem of state judicial appointment has been a combination of appointive and 
electoral systems known as the Missouri Plan. Under this system, the state 
governor appoints a judge from a list drawn up by a nonpartisan nominating 
commission composed of representatives from the bench, bar, and public, 
and after a short initial term, that judge then has to be confirmed in an 
unopposed election for a full term of office and any subsequent terms of 
reelection. ' J4 The states have thus also shown great attention to the issue of 
structural ways of protecting judges from control by either the executive or 
the legislature, but they have chosen rather different methods from those of 
the federal constitution. 
Ill. 5 U.S. (1 Cmnch) 137 (1803). 
J 12, Volcansek and Lafon mention without citation Trel'ert 1'. Weeden in Rhode Island in 1786 
ilnd Bayard 1', Singleton in North Carolina in 1787, YOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 24-
25. For the Bayard case citation, see Bayard v. SingleLon, 1 N.C. (MarL) 5 (N.c' 1787). For the 
Trewt{ case, see JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE TREVETT AGAINST WEEDEN (1787) (pamphlet 
containing all Lhe main documents and speeches in connection with the case as well as delibera-
tions of the Rhode Island legislature considering whether to impeaCh the judges for refusing to 
enforce the stalUte), document available in Gale Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale 
Document No. CW I 23874424. See also JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER 72-101 
(1991) (section of sourcebook on early American constitulional history devoted to the emergence 
and development of judiCial review, mentioning arguments for judicial review asserted in vain in 
Massachusetts courts as early as 1761; an example of judges in Virginia in 1788 asserting the 
power to refuse to enforce a slatute they deemed unconstitutional; several cases after adoption of 
the Constitution bllt prior to Mw-bury v. Madison; ancl commentaries by James Kenl). Powell's 
summary is that, while the constitutional clebates at ~he Philadelphia convention "did not pay close 
attention to the ql1e:o>tioll of judicial review, for the most part. . it seems fair La assert that 
supporters ancl opponents alike assumed that some form of it would exisL" !d. at 72. 
113. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 76. "In fact, eighty-six percent of American 
judges run for election and slate courts where judges sit for election hear the majority of all 
litigation in tbe United States." Tiede, supra note I, at 140 (footnotes omitted). 
114. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, HljJrCl note 105, at 135-40. 
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B. France 
The history of judges in France ,tarts with a cautionary example of the 
dangers of judges subject to no political control. The French kings, desper-
ate to raise funds, created a rather extreme form of judicial independence 
through the system of venality or sale of' judicial office, 115 a development 
that is smely ironic in view of the French royal claim to absolute power. 
The system of venality gave the French judges of the ancien regime an 
extraordinary level of independence, and may well have contributed to the 
degree to which the highest courts were willing to confront the king through 
their power to make regulations for their territories and to refuse to register 
royal edicts and ordinances which they thought against the public good or 
fundamental law. In the end, the courts came to be viewed as obstructive 
servants of the ancien regime, and a chief enemy of the revolution. Thc 
legacy was postrevolutionary suspicion of the judges. 116 
Although the democratic fervor of the French revolutionaries led them 
to adopt election of judges immediately after the fall of the ancien regime, 
the pattern of executive appointment of judges by political leaders began to 
assert itself during the Directoire. In the constitution of 1799, Napoleon 
assigned himself, as first consul, the task of appointing judges, originally 
from lists of notables. I I? "Judges, as a result, were men of the executive 
branch.""" Thus, shortly after the French Revolution, the pattern was estab-
lished of execulive dominance in the recruitment of the judiciary that was to 
become characteristic for France 1 19 
The history of the French judiciary in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries was one of ever-increasing bureaucratization, with both its posi-
tive and negative effects. lOG "As the modern magistrature was organized, 
Il5. In 1467, King LOllis XI affirmed thatjrdges who had purchased their office could not be 
removed, thereby giving the judges the guarantee of irremovability during their tenure. Marie 
Seong-Hak Kim, "GmH'ernemefit des luges" 011 "luges du Gouvernement"? The Revolutionary 
Traditions and JudiciaZIndependence ill France, 26 KORE.·\N J. INT'L & COMPo L. 1,8 (1998). BlIt 
see VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 44 (fixing the date at 1522). In 1604, that security in 
office was extended by recognition that the purchased office was hereditary. Id. 
116. Kim, supra note 115, at 9-10. As Kim S~lyS: 
Throughout the eighteenth century, the pariements [the chief French courts] consistently 
refused to register those royal enactments of whicb [hey disapproved. The judges re~ 
garded themselves as guardians of the laws of France, with a duty and a right to super-
vise the legislative process. They claimed to represent the national interest against 
authoritarian government. Tile inevitable consequence of the courts' consistent interfer-
ence in political lTI<.H[ers was, however, that they increasingly became obstructive, 
preventing any reforms ... which the government clesperalely needed to implement to 
save the monarchy on the eve of the Revolution. 
ld. at 9. 
117. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 59, 66-69,100-01. 
118. Id. at 101. 
119. "The principles affirmed throughout tlte nineLeenth and twel.ltkth centuries recognized 
clearly that the executive power \vas master in recruiting the judiciary." ld. at 103. 
120. Unlike the common law pattern of recruitment of judges from the ranks '01' experienced 
lawyers, Napoleon wanted to bring young men into the judiciary so they could be trained. id. at 
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common practice was that a judge stayed in office for his lifetime."]2] The 
principle of irremovability was discussed, but it did not give French judges 
much of a sense of security in office. RatJoer, all the way into World War II, 
the judicial ranks were regularly subject to purges on political grounds after 
each change of regime (of which there were many in France in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries). ]22 Moreover, judges were subject to disci-
plinary proceedings by the executive.]2' The judges were subject to an 
"obligation of reserve," a term which came to mean not only that the judges 
were forbidden to adopt a position contrary to that of the government, but 
also that they could be disciplined on this basis. "Confronted by these two 
principles, the judges lost all illusions of independence."]24 
The situation did not change for the judges until the inauguration of 
the Fifth Republic of France in 1958, whieh is also when France first 
adopted a form of judicial review of legislation. The 1958 Constitution 
adopted a system of judicial review of legislation in the form of a Constitu-
tional Council.]25 Until the reforms of 2008, judicial review was restricted 
to bills before they were signed into law by the president. Despite the for-
mal limitation, this French style of judicial review tumed out to playa very 
significant role in the political life of the country starting in the 1970s.]26 
106. But younger judges me[lnt greater interest in subsequent promotions, and the judiciary eager 
for promotions was a judiciary subject to influence by the executive that held the power of promo~ 
tion. Competitive examinations were first proposed in 1835 but nOl actually introduced until 1875, 
uul UnCi 1878, guvelIlIllelll millisters halted the ex.ams because they saw that the exams were 
limiting their prerogatives to confer judicial appointments. An examjnation system was success-
fully instituted by decrees in 1906 and 1908. Id. at 109-10; see also Doris M. Provine & Antoine 
Garapon, The Selection of Judges in France: Searching for a New Legitimacy, ill. ApPOlNTING 
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 176, 
183 (Kate MalJeson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006). 
121. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 115. 
122. Volcansek and Lafon mention purges after regime changes in 1814, 1830, 1848, 1852, 
1871, and 1940. But there were also purges of the judiciary "even when a new orientation was 
given lO a regime, as in 1807, 1810, 1883, and 1941." !d. at 110. These authors also mention two 
instances of a regime purging its own judges, first in 1807 and 1810 when Napoleon eliminated 
judges with revolutionary backgrounds in order to appeal to the old aristocracy, and again in 1941 
when the Vichy government dismissed Jewish judges. ld. at 121. 
J 23. In 1802, the Minister of Justice was given the power to preside over a disciplinary tribu-
nal which could suspend a judge and call him to account for his attitudes. Id. at 117. 
124. ld. at 118. 
125. F.L. Morton, Judicia! Review in France: A C01J1pClrative Analysis, 36 AM. J. COMPo L. 
89,90 (1988). It is obligatory to note that the Constitlltional Council was deliberately established 
as a "non-court" 80 that the French could maintain their principle of parliamentary supremacy. 
The Council is quite different from the regular coutts, Nevertheless, it is now generally recognized 
that the Council functions as a type of constitutional court. TIM KOOPMANS, COURTS AND POLlTJ· 
CAL INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 74-76 (2003). 
126. Two events greatly expanded the Council's power. In 1971, in a freedom of association 
cuse, the Council read into the Preamble of the 1958 Constitution all the civil liberties and human 
rights in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Preamble of the Constitution of the 
Fourth Republic, thus greatly expanding the potential for French constitutional law to include 
transformative law affecting human rights. In 1974, a technical amendment to the standing rules 
made it possible for the political opposition to refer a bill to the Council as long as they could 
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Reforms in 2008 promise to make constitutional review even more impor-
tant in France by permitting the regular and administrative courts to refer 
issues of constitutionality to the Constitutional Council from litigation 
pending before them.' 27 
The design of the Constitutional Council shows concern for the inde-
pendence of the constitutional judges. France chose an explicitly political 
way of achieving the right balance between political influence and judicial 
independence and, with regard to political influence, between executive and 
legislative branch int1uence. The Council is composed of nine members and 
they need not have legal credentials or experience. In fact, they are ap-
pointed by politicians and tend to be politicians, themselves. Of the nine 
members, three are appointed by the president of the republic, three by the 
president of the lower house, and three by the president of the upper house 
of the legislature, and the terms are staggered so that a third of the Council 
is replaced every three years, one by the chief executive power and two by 
legislative powers. Independence is secured after appointment by limiting 
each member of the Council to one nonrenewable nine-year term.128 It has 
been pointed oul that with two-thirds of the membership changing every six 
years, this is a system that is designed to keep the constitutional judges 
closely in step with major political movements in the country.129 
In the same time period during which France was adopting judicial 
review, it was also adopting for the first time a series of institutional ways 
of protecting its regular judges from executive branch control. Ordinance 
no. 58-1270 of December 22, 1958, provided lifetime tenure and further 
specified that no judge may be transferred or promoted without his or her 
consent. I3O Perhaps most importantly, the ordinance also established a judi-
cial training center, today known as the Ecole nationale de la magistrature 
(ENM). Admission to ENM is by competitive exam, all students pass the 
twenty-eight-month training program though grades playa role in determin-
ing what kind of judicial appointments 2re given, and ENM graduates pro-. 
vide most of the appointments to both the juqiciary and the ranks of the 
prosecutors. This system of appointment after competitive examinations 
sharply limits the scope for executive influence in the process of making 
initial appointments. 131 
muster 60 votes in either the Assembly or the Senate, thus greatly expanding the ease with which 
bills could be challenged in the Council. Morton, supra note 125, at 90~91, 
127. Alec Stone Sweet, The Coltstirurional COllllcil Wid the Trcm~1'orm{ftiol1 of the Republic, in 
CAHIERS DU CONS61L CONSTITUTIONNEL (forthcoming 2008), {/milable at http://works,bepress. 
coml a lee _stone _5 weet/2 3 . 
[28. To, supra note 109, at 309; Provine & Garapon, .wpm note 120, at 180-82. 
129. Morton, SIIpru note 125, aI 98-101. 
130. To, supra note 109, at 123. 
131. VOLCANSEK & LAFON. slIpm note [05, at 129-31; Provine & Garapon, mpm note 120, tlt 
183-84. 
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Protection from executive dominance in that process is, however, not 
as strong a guarantor of judicial independence in France as it is in the 
United States because, unlike the common law pattern of recruitment of 
judges from the more senior ranks of the practicing bar, the French pattern 
developed in the course of the nineteenth century into a career judiciary. A 
desire to be promoted exposes a judge to repeated appointment proceedings, 
which give the appointing power-typically the executive in the career ju-
diciaries of the civil law-repeated opportunities to punish the judge for 
earlier decisions the appointing power does not like by denying the request 
for a promotion. The ambitious judge thus repeatedly comes under pressure 
to conform to the legal views of the executive branch. For that reason, in a 
career judiciary, like that of France, limitations on executive influence over 
judicial promotions are vitally important. 
In the Fifth Republic, executive power over judicial appointment was 
further reduced by the Conseit superieur de fa magistrature (CSM), a colle-
gial body governing the magistracy, which in France includes both the reg-
ular judges and all prosecutors. The CSM has the power to make 
nominations to the president of the republic with respect to appointment of 
the highest judicial offices in the regular court system. Even though the 
CSM only nominates the highest judges, its nominations are in effect deter-
minative because the president has no information upon which to disagree. 
Prior to 1993, the president might have been able to control the CSM nomi-
nations indirectly through his power to appoint the members of the CSM, 
but constitutional reforms in 1993 diminished his power substantially.'32 
Opinion appears nevertheless divided as to whether the appointment of 
these most important judicial positions is effectively controlled by or insu-
lated from the executive poweL I33 At any rate, in the 1993 reforms, the 
number of highest judicial offices in effect determined by CSM nomination 
was expanded to cover more judges so that today approximately the top 
four hundred judges are covered. 134 
132. Kim, supra note 115, at 30-31. Prior to 1993, the President of the Republic chose all the 
members of the CSM. By reforms in 1993, the President's power was reduced to choosing one 
member. For descriptions of the complicated way in which the rest of the membership is chosen 
(the specific COUl1s from which certain members must be selected and the other nonjudicial groups 
who are represented), see To, supra note 109, at 327; Kim, supra note 115, at 31 n.91. The 
President of the Republic and the Minister of Justice preside at the meetings, and there are ten 
other members. Id. 
133. The President's participation is said to be a formality only, and the President and Minis-
ter of Justice can easily be outvoted by the oliler members. To, sllpra note 109, at 327,342,344; 
Kim, SUpf'{/ note 1 J 5, at 33-34; Provine & Garapon, supra llote 120, at 184-85. Provine and 
Garapon say ve-ry confidently that the appointment process for the senior judges is "wholly insll-
lated from political oversight." Id. at 185. 
134. Prior to the 1993 reforms, that appointment power included the COli!' de cclss(ftian <the 
supreme comi for the regular court system) and first presidents of the courts of appeals. As a 
result of the reforms, that appointment power was extended to include the presidents of the most 
imporlElllt regular first instance courts (tribul1({ux de grande instance). Kim, supra note 115, at 33; 
Provine & Garapon, supra note 120, at 185. 
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For all other regular judges and prosecutors (over six thousand posi-
tions 135), it is the minister of justice who makes the determinative nomina-
tions, and the CSM can make only a recommendation on each candidate, 
which the minister of justice is free to ignore. 136 The promotion process for 
the highest judges may thus exclude executive branch influence to a large 
extent, but the promotion process for the great mass of lower judges does 
not,137 and in a career bureaucracy like the French judiciary, one does not 
come to be considered for the highest posts without having advanced up the 
ranks from the lower judiciary, where the influence of the minister of jus-
tice is strong. Marie Seong-Hak Kim reports that "the political persuasion 
of an individual judge is often an important factor in determining the more 
or less rapid advancement of that judge." 138 
Disciplinary matters have been better shielded from executive branch 
involvement. The CSM also resolves disciplinary charges against judges, 
but in this case, neither the president of the republic nor the minister of 
justice presides over the council as they otherwise do ex officio, and, as 
already mentioned, the reforms in 1993 further reduced the president's 
power to influence the CSM. The institutional structure for judicial disci-
pline is thus one of the strongest protections for judicial independence. 139 
The other development in the Fifth Republic that is thought to have 
contributed importantly to judicial independence from the executive was the 
creation of the Syndicat de la magistrature on June 12, 1968. The formation 
of the Syndicat, a union for judges, is meant to strengthen the judges' abil-· 
ity to withstand external pressures. In particular, the union has vocally 
"condemned hierarchy in the judiciary as an excessive burden on a judge's 
position that obliges him to adopt a conformist attitude for the satisfaction 
of his superiors."14o It appears that the creation of ENM, the judicial train-
ing center, may have been the catalyst for the formation of a judicial union 
because, through the training at ENYl, judicial trainees became "accus-
tomed to collective discussion and action.,,141 
135. Kim, supra note 115, at 33; Provine & Qurapan, supra note 120, at 184. 
136. To, supra note 109, at 342-44 (describing the complex process for deCiding on 
promotions). 
137. Id. at 344; Kim, supm note 115, at 32-34, 38-39, 
138. Kim, supra note 115, at 32. 
139. To, suprfl note 109, at 336-37, 347-48; Kim, slIpm note 115, m 30. This protection and 
the proclamation of the principle of irremovability in Article 65 of the 1958 Constitution must, to 
a significant extent, neutralize the effect of the provision in the Ordinance of December 22, 1958, 
imposing the "obligation of reserve" (the term that had been used in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries to bind judges to the goveument's positions). See VOLCANSEK & LAFON, 
supra note 105, at 123 (Ordinance of December 22, 1958); supra text accompanying note 123-24 
(use of term in earlier bistory). 
140. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 132; see also Kim, mpra note 115, at..fO n.124. 
141. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 105, at 132 (footnote omitted). 
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Thus far we bave been talking abou:: the regular courts and the Consti-
tutional Council, but France also has a set of administrative courtS.J42 The 
administrative court judges have only much more recently been granted any 
guarantees of independence, and they are considerably weaker than the 
guarantees given to the regular judges. Traditionally considered administra-
tive personnel within the Council of State, the judges of the lower adminis-
trative courts (flfSt instance and appeal) finally received substantial 
guarantees of independence in 1986, when they were given a number of the 
same protections that the regular judges had received. These protections 
include the principle of irremovability and a selection and promotion pro-
cess that restricts the president's discretion in making appointments by lim-
iting him to lists of candidates furnished by a nominating council. However, 
unlike the regular judges, who enjoy relatively strong protections against 
executive branch interference with respect to discipline, the administrative 
judges are still subject to discipline by the administration, which is always a 
party to the cases before them, and the members of the Council of State (the 
highest level of administrative court judge) are also excluded from the pro-
tections concerning appointment and advancement. 143 In short, they remain 
subject to a system that could be used to exert fairly strong executive con-
trol, and French commentators appear split on the degree to which that con-
trol is actually nsed.'44 
In snm, the first set of changes in the wake of the 1958 Constitution, 
which introduced judicial review in France, strengthened the independence 
of the regular judiciary by instituting a judicial training centcr and an initial 
appointment process that is almost wholly insulated from the executive, as 
well as creation of a judicial union in 1968. Promotions, except to the high-
est levels within the regular court system, remain in the control of the min-
142. As in the case of the Constitutional Tribunal, it is obligatory 10 note that the bodies 
reviewing administrative action were deliberately set up as part of the administration and not part 
of the court system. They were not OiiginalJy designated as "courts" and the highest administrative 
court in France is still just one section of a major French administrative body, the Council of State. 
None of the administrative judges are considered part of the "magistracy," which includes the 
regular judges and prosecutors. Yet it is clear that they in effect perform the same function as 
administrative judges in other countries that have separate administrative courts. Provine & 
Garapon, supra note 120, at 189. 
143. To, supra note 109, at 344-50. 
144. DANIEL CHABANOL, LE JUGE ADMINISTRATIF 15-18 (1993) (administrative judges in fact 
generally independent at all levels; however, author discusses only lower administrative judges); 
JACQUES CHEVALLlER, L'ELABORATION HISTORIQUE DU PRINCIPE DE SEPARATION DE LA JURIDIC· 
T10N ADMINISTRATIVE ET DE L'ADMINISTRATION ACTIVE 10 (1970) (judicial independence essen-
tially depends on good graces of those in power)~ OUVIER GOHlN, CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 
71-76 (2d ed. 1999) (optimistic about independenC':;'! after the reforms; pointing out that only 
twenty judges have been dismissed from COl1seil d'Etat without pension); DANIELE LOSCI-IAK, LE 
ROLE POLlTIQUE DU JUGE ADM1NISTRATIF FRANC;AIS 13-33 (1972) (writing before reforms; ad-
ministrative judges have little independence); JACQUES VIGUIER, LE CONTENTlEUX ADMINSTRATIF 
12,28 (2e1 ed, 2005) (positive about judicial-independence for administrative camts after reforms; 
but noting the vulne-rability of the judges on the Consei! d'ETat). 
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ister of justice, but promotions to the highest levels, as well as disciplinary 
procedures at all levels of the magistracy, are relatively well shielded from 
executive control. Judicial review, first established in 1958, was substan-
tially strengthened in the 1970s, and the constitutional reform of 1993 fur-
ther reduced the possibility of executive power over promotions and 
disciplinary proceedings by greatly diminishing executive power to appoint 
the CSM, the judicial nominating and disciplinary body. In addition, pursu-
ant to changes in 1986, most of the administrative court judges, but not the 
highest ones, began to enjoy similar protections from executive control over 
selection, but none of the administrative law jndges are protected from what 
is perhaps the greatest form of executive control, the power to discipline 
sitting judges. As a result of these developments, at least the regular judici-
ary can finally think of their career as a reasonably secure one. 145 
C. Great Britain 
In the centuries after Parliament's victory over Stuart pretentions to 
absolutism, England evolved for itself a system that apparently gave British 
judges considerable independence in fact though the institutional arrange-
ments suggested, first, at least a kind of symbolic dominance by Parliament, 
and later, and more substantially, by the executive. In the first place, the 
supreme appeal jurisdiction actually developed in Parliament, in the appeals 
jurisdiction of the House of I "ords, 146 though as the judicial chamher of the 
House of Lords developed, it became clear that it was treated as a true 
court, and the judges in the judicial chamber of the House of Lords devel-
oped a practice of abstaining from participation in the legislative functions 
of the House of Lords. More significantly, the development of the system of 
appointment of judges by the Lord Chancellor appeared to subject the 
judges to strong political int1uence by the executive. 147 While in theory the 
Lord Chancellor was a member of all three branches of government-a 
personal violation of the separation of powers doctrine-he was appointed 
by the prime minister as part of the cabinet and was therefore first and 
foremost a representative of executive power. Especially because of the al-
most complete lack of transparency in this function, judicial appointment by 
the Lord Chancellor thus appeared to be open to the free play of politics. 
While it has been stoutly maintained that the system actually functioned 
largely in a nonpolitical way that emphasized professional merit, there are 
examples of politicization of the process throughout the twentieth 
century. 148 
145. VOLCAr-iSEK & LAf'ON, supm note 105, at 129. 
146. Shapiro, Judicial II/dependence, supm note 21, at 626. 
147. ld. at 632; see a/so AI3RAHAM, Slipi'll note 105, at 31-34. 
148. Kate Malleson, 111c New Judicial AppoiiHrncms Commission ill Eng/WId WId W(I/t's: Nen 
Wille ill New Bottles?, in ApPO[NTlNG JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICI.·\L POWER 39, 41--+2 (Kate 
Malleson & Peter H. Russel! eds., 2006); Stevens, .wpm note 12, at 613-14. 
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The rules on dismissal might appear to give judges better protection 
from politics, By a provision of the Act of Settlement, British judges have 
in theory been protected against political dismissals since 1760, when the 
provision took effect, subject only to impeachment by both houses of Par-
liament.'49 It eventually became clear that the impeachment threat was not 
substantial. "[S]ince the Act of Settlement of 1701, only one judge has been 
removed on any grounds," 150 and it ha5 been asserted that "dismissal of a 
[British] judge for political reasons is impossible today for all practical pur-
poses,"'51 However, Stevens points out that technically such a statement 
can be made only about the judges on the major C0U11s (High Court, Court 
of Appeals, and the House of Lords) because "the vast bulk of the full-time 
judiciary in England (now some 1300) have no protection under the Act of 
Settlement, although in fairness to the Lord Chancellor's Department, dis-
missals are handled with considerahle natural justice [what is called in the 
United States "due process"],"152 More importantly, Stevens cites a number 
of significant instances in the course of the twentieth century in which the 
prime minister or Lord Chancellor was able to put substantial pressure on 
judges from the major courts to resign, sometimes with success, '53 
The whole system was criticized as not being sufficiently "modern," It 
was argued that even if the current system was not working in a particularly 
politicized way, the lack of any safeguard keeping the Lord Chancellor 
from playing politics, especially in the process of judicial appointments, 
was troubling, The lack of safeguards, the absence of a more clearly fair 
system for judicial appointments, and the lack of sufficient diversity in the 
makeup of the judiciary were argued to undermine public confidence in the 
courtsI54 As a result, around the turn of the millennium, Great Britain un-
dertook some sweeping changes with regard to its judicial appointments 
system, but they were part of a much broader set of changes that can only 
be termed a constitutional revolution, 155 
One important chapter of that revolution took place in 1998, when 
Great Britain finally adopted a limited, but important form of judicial re-
view of legislation, Although the British have long steadfastly adhered to 
the principle of parliamentary supremacy, in 1998 they adopted the Human 
Rights Act, a statute which incorporates into British law the European Con-
149. See supru text following note 105. 
150. ABRAHAM, supra note 105, at 52. 
IS!. Id. at 52. 
152. Steven,~, supra note 12, at 60 I. These less-protected judges include circuit judges, record-
ers, district judges, and magistrates. For the hierarchy of judges in the British legal system, see 
GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, ENGUSH LEGAL SYSTEM 237~38 (8th ed. 2006). 
153. Stevens, supra note 12, at 600~01. Similarly, the government ha,<; succeeded in cutting 
judicial salaries on occasion. ld. at 615~16. 
154. Malleson, supra note 148, at 40~41. 
155. Colin Picker, "A Ught unfo the I\fations"-The New British Federalism, the Scottish 
ParfiClIl1f:'IIf, (I/J.d Consfitutional Lessons for Mliitietiwic Stales, 77 TuL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002). 
792 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 5:3 
vention on Human Rights as a statutory bill of rights. Pursuant to that act, 
the British courts may not refuse to follow statutes that they deem incom-
patible with that statutory bill of rights. Instead, they are enjoined to inter-
pret statutes to be consistent with the Human Rights Act, if possible. If they 
cannot interpret a statute to be consistent with the Human Rights Act, then, 
while giving effect to the inconsistent act, certain specified higher British 
courts may also make a declaration of incompatibility. While that declara-
tion places no obligation on Parliament to amend the statute in question, it 
does empower the executive branch and Parliament, if the political will is 
there, to work together on a fast-track basis to amend the statute to bring it 
into compliance. Like the French style of judicial review, the British ver-
sion is formally quite limited, but it also is designed to let the courts play an 
important role in the political life of the nation through the power to declare 
incompatibility. l56 
The next chapter in the rolling constitutional revolution in Britain in-
cluded the establishment of a judicial appointments commission for En·· 
gland and Wales in the first years of the new millenniurn'57 and then the 
Constitutional Reform Act of 2005. l58 This act initiated the move of the 
judicial chamber of the House of Lords out of Parliament, renaming it the 
Supreme Court, thus eliminating every vestige of the ancient suggestion 
that Parliament itself was supervising the judges through an appellate juris-
diction. It transferred the Lord Chancellor's judicial functions to other 
members of the judiciary to make it clear that that office is no longer part of 
the judicial branch. 
Another major result of these changes was to subordinate the Lord 
Chancellor's formerly unchecked power to appoint judges to that of the new 
judicial appointments commissions. Technically, the commissions only 
make recommendations to the Lord Chancellor, but they need recommend 
only one name for each available position. The Lord Chancellor has the 
right to reject that name, but if he does so, he must give a statement of 
reasons. lS9 The members of the commissions are appointed by the secretary 
of state for constitutional affairs and membership is required to be broadly 
156, Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commotlweulth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. 
COMPo L. 707, 732-39 (2001). 
[57. Set! generally Matleson. slIpm note 148. The Appointments Commission fm England and 
Wales was announced by the British government [:1 2003. ld. CIt 39. A similar board had been 
established for Scotland in 2002, Alan Paterson, Tlte Scotrish iudiciof Appointments Board: New 
Wine in Old Bottles?, in ApPOINTING Jl'DGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER 13, 1--1- (Kate Mal-
!esan & Peter H. Russell eels., 2006), and olle was plL1nned for Northern Ireland a~ well, Malleson, 
supro note 1.:1-8, at 53 n.4. Two commissions were actually establisht:d for England, one for the 
Supreme COLIn, and one for nil tbe other judges. ld. at 46. 
158. See, e.g., Robert Hazell, The Continuing DYflwnisl/I of COllsliruriO/wl Re.fi)J'J/l, 60 PARUA. 
MENTARY AFF. 3 (2007); Diana Woodhouse, Unital Kingdom: The COllstitlltiolUd Rt1'oI'JI1 Act 
2005-Df!Jellding Judicia! Independence the Ellglish Way, 5 INT'L 1. CONST. L. 153 (2007). 
159. See genemlly Malleson, supra note 148, at 46-47. It is unclear what will COllnt as un 
acceptable reason. It!. 
,-,-". 
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representative of various stakeholders in the judiciary, including lay people, 
but the legal influence predominates. 160 It is too soon to determine whether 
the result of these changes has been to continue executive dominance 
through the office of the lord chancellor or cO create a corporatist control of 
judges over the judiciary or a process of citizen control over judges in 
which the executive influence is quite minimal buttbere is room for modest 
play of nonpartisan political influence in the commissions. Only time will 
te11.'61 
D. Chief Conclusions from Historical Sketches 
The foregoing histories illustrate rather clearly tbe vigorous role tbat 
political oversigbt over judges has played in modern Western democracies 
and the coincidence between adoption of judicial review and adoption of 
structural protections for the judges. My precise arguments, bowever, re-
quire some additional words of explanation. 
While at the turn of the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, tbe legisla-
ture may still have appeared as much of a threat to judicial independence as 
the executive in both the United States and Great Britain, by the second half 
of the nineteeuth century, the democratic forms of government had matured 
to the point that the greater capability of the executive to exercise influence 
over the judges had become apparent, as it was in France from the begin-
ning of Napoleon's rule. All of the structural protections subsequently 
adopted in France and England were aimed at diminishing executive control 
or influence over the judiciary, as section II argues shonld be the case. 
Section II also postulated that even mature democracies shonld pre-
serve some role for political influence over judges. The U.S. models obvi-
160. See generally ie!, at 48-50. Of the Commission'ii fifteen members, three are selected by 
the Judges' Council. The rest are selected through open competition, and the membership is re-
quired to be broadly representative of the various stakeholders in the judiciary. The Chairman is 
required to be a lay person. Five of the remaining fourteen members must be judges, one must be 
a barrister, one a solicitor, five must be lay persons, one must be a member of an administrative 
tribunal, and one must be a lay justice member. JUDICIAL ApPOINTMENTS COMM'N, CHAIRMAN 
AND COMMISSIONERS, bttp://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/about/chair.htm (last visited Nov. 
25, 2008). 
The appointment commission for the Supreme Court is much smaller and will be convened 
only as needed. It consists of tbe president of the Supreme Court, as chair, the deputy president, 
and one person from each of the three U.K. appointments boards or commissions. Malleson, supra 
note 148, at 46. 
161. Hazell, supra note lS8, at 18 (predicting that the commission will be dominated by its 
judicial membership, thus transforming the British system into kind of corporatist one); Malle-son, 
supra note 148, at 39, 51. The Commission's website says that it was "set up in order to maintain 
and strengthen judicial independence by taking responsitility for selecting candidates for judicial 
office out of the hands of the Lord Chancellor and making the appointments process clearer and 
more accountable." JUDICIAL ApPOINTMENTS COMM'N, ABOUT Us, http://www.judiciaiappoint-
ments.gov.uk/about/about.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2008), In its first year of operation, it rec-om-
mended 458 candidates for judicial office, and the Lord Chancellor did not reject a single one, 
JUDICIAL ApPOINTMENTS COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT AND STATISTICS, http://www-judiciaJ 
appointments.gov,uk/annuallannual.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
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ously fit that postulate. By contrast, one might argue that the trend in France 
and Great Britain seems to be toward excluding the executive from a 
largely depoliticized process in which judges exercise the greatest influence 
over the selection and promotion of judges and in which judges are pro-
tected from discharge by tenure in office and quasi-judicialized disciplinary 
proceedings that are also not subject to control or substantial influence by 
the executive branch. If we interpret that trend as one toward complete de-
politicization in favor of a bureaucratic, corporatist control of judges by 
judges, my analysis in section II, the example of the largely autonomous 
French judges under the ancien regime, and the current example of the Bra-
zilian judiciary suggest that it could be a problematic one. 162 
But in fact, neither country has completely eliminated political over-
sight, even by the executive. In France, the minister of justice is still fully in 
control of most judicial promotions (except for promotions to the highest 
offices), and the executive branch is also represented on the committees that 
decide the highest-level appointments. With regard to administrative 
judges, the executive retains full power to appoint the top ones and to disci-
pline or dismiss all of them. In Great Britain, the Lord Chancellor retains 
the power to refuse to appoint a candidate nominated for judicial office by 
the appointments commission though it remains to be seen whether he will 
try to use that power. Moreover, the nominating councils in Great Britain at 
least are required to be broadly representative and include lay people, a 
structure which allows for modest play of political influence though it may 
prove to be largely controlled by its judicial members 163 Thus neither 
country has yet abolished all avenues of political control over judges al-
though Great Britain may have gone the furthest toward that position. 
Perhaps the newness of the French ancl British reforms adopting struc-
tural protections for the judiciary will surprise Americans because their 
founding fathers addressed these issues roughly two l)undred years earlier 
in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution. The delay seems clearly related to a 
difference concerning the conceptions of the role of courts in the governing 
structure. The approach in the U.S. Constitution was part of a new concep-
tion of government that was based on creating a durable balance among the 
three separate powers or branches of government. The British and French 
were much slower to come to the view of the judiciary as a coequal branch 
though they both seem to be coming to something like that view by the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. The British delay may be explained in 
part by the fact that their revolution took place well before the development 
162. For French judges before the revolution, see supra section IV 3(b). For the Brazilian 
judges, see authorities cited supra note 8. See also Provine & Garapon, Silpfa note 120, at 195 (a 
U.S. and a French scholar suggesting that French judges lack legitimacy because they are not 
chosen in an openly political process that links them to the public). 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61. The French counciLs are even more clearly 
dominated by judicial members. See Kim, slIpra note 115, at 31 n.91. 
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of separation of powers doctrine. 164 Perhaps the British delay could also be 
ascribed in part to a feeling that structural protections were unnecessary 
because the British judiciary had long had a certain degree of de facto inde-
pendence rooted in the corporatist structure of the whole common law legal 
system. 165 In France the heavy legacy that the courts were saddled with 
from prcrevolutionary days gave the French an aversion to thinking of the 
judiciary as a coequal branch; they readily accepted the idea of executive 
branch supervision and control. The inauguration of judicial review of leg-
islation in 1958 in France and in 1998 in Great Britain, seems to have 
caused a reassessment of the courts' role. 
For that very reason, some will therefore no doubt see the short period 
of time within which all three of these countries adopted both judicial re-
view and structural protections for the judiciary as supporting, not my broad 
thesis about transfonnative law, but a narrower one to the effect that adop-
tion of judicial review may tend to stimulate substantial support for protect-
ing the independence of judges. I would not argue against that thesis 
because it is included within the transformative law thesis. I have argued in 
section III(B) that judicial review is an especially important source of trans-
formative law. The history recounted here suggests that the adoption of ju-
dicial review does provide special force to the arguments for making the 
judges independent. With powers of judicial review, judges become more 
obviously the equal of the branches that make the laws. The shift in mental 
paradigm goes a long way to explaining the close timing, but perhaps not 
far enough. 
The adoption of judicial review suffices to explain the adoption of pro-
tections for the independence of the judiciary in a system of diffuse review 
like that of the United States, in which all regular courts carry out judicial 
review of legislation. It is obviously problematic to subject judges to the 
control of either the legislature or the executive if those are the judges who 
are going to decide the constitutionality of laws created by those two 
164. If by "revolution," we mean the violent overthrow of an existing pOlitical order, then the 
British revolution was pretty much over by the beginning of the eighteenth century while separa-
tion of powers doctrine finds its earliest articulation in Montesquieu's Spirit of the Lmvs. Vile 
gives 1748 as the date by which Montesquieu had formulated the doctdne in "recognizably mod-
ern form." MJ,C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 90 (1967). 
165. Shapiro has argued tbat long before the Act of Settlement (170 I), English judges became 
independent of both the king and Parliament because "[n]o one could understand the law except 
the lawyers who constituted a closed guild that co-opted new members by apprenticeship. Judges 
were chosen from and led the guild .... Judges were independent because they operated a system 
of law that was essential to the well-being of the nation but that no one but lawyers could under-
stand." Shapiro, Judicial Independence, supra note 21. at 624. Shapiro, however, sees the high 
point of British judicial independence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, id. at 623, 630, 
with the courts voluntarily subordinating themselves once again to the fused executive-legislative 
branch of parliamentary government in the twentieth century, not so much by suffering greater 
interference in specific cases, but by virtue of administrative law doctrines that subordinated the 
courts to the policies of the administrative state. Id. at 633-52. 
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branches. The same logic applies at least to the higher British judges who 
have the power to make declarations of incompatibility,166 though not so 
clearly to the lower courts judges who do not have that power. The same 
logic also suffices to explain why in creating a specialized constitutional 
court, France would provide some protection against either executive or 
legislative dominance over the judges of the constitutional court by distrib-
uting the power to nominate the judges on that court equally to the president 
of the republic and to each of the presidents of the two houses of parlia-
ment. But how can we explain why the French adopted structural protec-
tions for the regular judges at about the same time as they adopted judicial 
review? 
Perhaps it could be argued that the adoption of judicial review is an 
event of such high political salience that it suffices to bring to the fore all 
the important issues affecting the judiciary. But what makes the indepen-
dence of the regular judiciary an issue? It cannot logically be the judicial 
review that is assigned to a different body of judges. It is true that French 
administrative courts have gradually been establishing the power to adjudge 
the constitutionality of executive action, but even after 1958, the regular 
courts were not thought to have any power to determine the constitutional-
ity of either executive or legislative action. Stalting in 1975, the Court of 
Cassation began asserting, somewhat timidly at first, the power to interpret 
statutes in such a way that treaty provisions would prevail over contrary 
provisions of preexisting statutes. In 1988, the Court of Cassation for the 
first time relied On constitutionally guaranteed rights to interpret statutes. In 
the 1980s, the top administrative court, the Council of State, which had long 
used "general principles" as the basis for restrictions on administrative ac-
tion, began emphasizing the constitutional basis for many of these princi-
ples, and in 1989, the administrative courts joined the regular courts in 
using treaties to invalidate contrary prior legislation. Since then, both the 
top regular and administrative courts have begun asserting much more ag-
gressively what is in effect a form of judicial review based on treaty law. 167 
166. Tbus Robert Hazell has argued that the new' British Supreme Court will become "more of 
a constitutional COUlt," that it will consequenlly have a "much higher profile," aLld that these 
developments "will stimulate much greater interest in who the judges are and how they came to be 
appointed." Hazell, sltpm note 158, at 17-18. 
167. For traditional powers of regular courts and adlrinistrative courts with respect to judicial 
review of constitutionality of executive ancllegislative action, sec RENE DAVID, FRBNCH LAW 27, 
30 (Michael Kindred tram;" 1972). For the lise of constitutional law to interpret statutes, see ALEC 
STONE SWEET, GOVERN1NG WITH JllDGES 122-24 (2000). For development of review halied on 
international treaties, see JEAN COMBACAU & SERGE SUR, DROIf INTERN."\TIONAL PUBLIC 187-88 
(6th ed. 2004); Pierre Michel Eisemann & Raphae\e Rivier, Notio//al Trel/t)' Law al1d Pmctice: 
France, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 253,269 (Duncan B. Hollis et at. cds., 2(05); 
ANDREW WEST ET I-\L., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 163-'(l4 (2d ed. (998). For the initial timidity 
of the French COtHt~ in applying tl'eaty law and the more vigorom; approach led l)y the admjni~tra" 
tive courts, see D1Nfl Quoc NGUYEN, PATRICK DAILUER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC 237 (7th ed. 2002); Emmanuel DecHux et ai., Fnll/cl', in L'INTEGJ{!',:noN !)U Dlwrr INTER-
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Thus starting at least by the late 19805, concerns about the neutrality of the 
judges of the Constitutional Council would properly have applied as well to 
the regular judges, who were asserting a kilCd of judicial review power. But 
the main reforms to protect the regular judiciary took place between 1958 
and 1968, at a time when the regular judiciary was assumed to have no role 
in litigation over the constitutionality of legislation, So something like the 
transformative law thesis appears to be necessm), to explain why, well 
before the late 1980s and even before 1975, adoption of a constitutional 
court for judicial review should result in structural guarantees of indepen-
dence from the executive branch for the regular judiciary, 
Perhaps my argument makes too much of a short gap in the historical 
record, The transfonnative law thesis, I have said, is about a slow-acting 
mechanism, Belief in the transfonnative role of law has built up slowly and 
steadily in the Western legal traditions OVer quite a few centuries, Other 
than the pattern of adopting structural protections for judges at about the 
same time as the adoption of judicial review of legislation, I cannot point to 
a pattern that reveals a close temporal connection between the adoption of 
particular forms of transformative law anj structural protections for the 
courts, nor do I expect to find such correspondences, But I believe that the 
more transformative law is adopted in a society that really expects the law 
to be enforced, the stronger will be the popular support for shielding the 
courts from too much executive branch controL Maybe support for judicial 
review and the new view of separation of powers, which posits a much 
more powerful role of courts as an equal branch of government, builds in a 
similarly slow way and could result in concerns for judicial independence 
before it results in adoption of judicial review of legislation, 
But even if that is true, leaving the broader category of transformative 
law out of the explanation would miss a key point: Transformative law is 
also an aspect of the separation of powers, That is, according to the mecha" 
nism based on Shapiro's model for courts, belief in any type of transtorma-
tive law, even nonconstitutional types of transforma!ive law, should 
produce a concern that substantial executive branch control over the courts 
could result in preventing the law from having the desired effect of chang-
ing society, Belief in nonconstitutional transformative Jaw should thus en-
gender the same concern for independence of the courts that constitutional 
law and judicial review engender because political leaders are involved, 
broadly speaking, in all legal issues that invoke important issues of social 
policy, not just in those involved in constitulional review, The transforma-
tive law thesis helps us see that the change in the concept of the courts' role 
that took place in each of the three coun:ries studied was not just about 
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation and executive action, It 
NATIONAL P.T COMMUNAUTA1RE-DANS L'Or~DRE JURIDIr)lJE NATIONAL 241,265 (Pierre Michel 
Eisemann ed., [996). 
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was about the courts' roles in all types of cases that feature transformative 
law, including disputes between private parties. 
V. CONCLUSIONS: THE CULTURE OF TRANSFORMATIVE LAW AND 
STRATEGIES FOR FOSTERING IT 
The focus of this article has been a set of twin inquiries into some key 
aspects of the cultural supports for executive dominance and the potential of 
a belief in transformative law to counter political leaders' claims for control 
over judges. In order to conclude this rather far-tlung investigation, this 
section first draws together the discussion of various values that have been 
implicated in these investigations as a first step toward defining the culture 
of transformative law, and hence, by one of the chief arguments of this 
paper, of the culture of judicial independence. The section then closes with 
a brief exploration of the implications of the transformative law thesis for 
judicial reform in Latin America by giving some examples of strategies that 
could be effective if the transfOimative law thesis is valid. 
A. Some Key Values Associated with a Culture of Transformative Law 
Without claiming to describe a complete catalogue of the values, atti-
tudes, and habits of mind that are important to a culture supportive of trans .. 
formative law-and by hypothesis, therefore, judicial independence-the 
foregoing inquiries have revealed some of the values that appear to be most 
important to this culture. Our discussion started with beliefs in the primacy 
of politics and the transformative role of law, so this summary should start 
there, too. 
The principal hypothesis of this article is that a key value in a culture 
of transformative law is the belief that law can and should be a tool for 
transforming society. A culture of transformative law expects that law will 
be reasonably well enforced if it is not followed. Because it can be expected 
to be enforced, it can serve as a tool for reshaping society. This value thus 
gives a more specific meaning to the general statement that the essence of 
the rule of law is "a widespread assumption within society that law matters 
and should matter." 168 It is this restatement of a rule of law value that, by 
virtue of Shapiro's model for court legitimacy, provides a connection be-
tween judicial independence and the effectiveness of law in which the exec-
utive branch has an obvious interest. It is not just a claim that decisions of 
courts should be enforced, though that is an important part of the idea, but 
an equally important part of the idea of transformative law is that courts 
will treat the transformative law as part of the body oflaw so they cun fairly 
render judgments against parties in accordance with that law. 
t68. Martin Krygier, MW'xisfIl and the Rille o.f Law: Reflections After ,lie Col/apse (~f COfJlIIllf-
lIislll, [5 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 633, 646 (1990). 
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Politics and law have a complex relationship, but one aspect of that 
relationship. even in a democracy, jl1volves a competitive tension, espe-
cially with regard to judges. The rule of law ideal suggests that judges 
should be sufficiently independent of political authority to decide cases ac-
cording to law and not according to politics, yet we and especially our polit-
ical leaders also want some assurance that judges' decisions will not be 
based on political values so far from the electoral majority who put the 
leaders in office that they will unduly ob,truct the policies of the elected 
branches of government. Even as we accept some degree of obstruction as 
the inevitable result of judicial independence, we also tend to insist on some 
degree of political influence over judges. Political influence can come from 
many different sources, but the executive branch is generally best organized 
to project political influence over the jUdiciary. For that reason, the execu-
tive branch tends to pose the major threat to judicial independencc, even in 
a democracy. There are many reasons why the citizenry may wish to give 
power over the courts to the executive branch or to tolerate executive domi-
nance over the courts, but they all amount to one major claim of the pri-
macy of politics over law~typically, that. the current situation is so difficult 
or dangerous that the executive needs to be able to assert its political leader-
ship without interference by the courts. Because belief in the importance of 
the guiding role of a strong political leader is not confined to authoritarian 
societies, we have to have a healthy respect for politics as part of the culture 
of tranSfUrIllalive law. Judicial reform to strengthen judicial independence 
should not therefore seek complete independence from political influence, 
but only enough to preserve the courts' central claim to be able to decide 
individual cases according to law, not pol;tics169 
169, This article focuses on culture, not On design of judicial institutions, but our discllssion 
permits llS to see the outlines of the cllief dilemmas for this kind of design issue. Instead of 
eliminating political influence altogether, the goal should be a reasonable bahmce between politi-
cal influence and judicial independence so tbat neither political influence over the judges nor the 
judges' ability to decide cases according to Inw (and not just according to politics) is completely 
eliminated. Because executive power over sittingjllCiges can so easily eliminate any appearance of 
judicial independence, finding the light balance might seem a simple matter of allowing executive 
influence over judicial appointments but eliminating executive power to discipline or dismi~s 
judges after appointment and giving judges long, nonrenewable or lifetime terms. Such systems 
permit a degree of political influence over judges without allowing the executive to retaliate 
against the judges for specific decisions. The tendency in all legal systems, however, for judges to 
seek promotions to new judgeships complicates the problem. The power not to promote is almost 
as strong a power to discipljne judges as the power to dismiss. Eliminating execlltive power en-
tirely from the appointment, promotion, and c1iscipli11<lry process might seem an attractive solu-
tion, but the sorts of judicial councils that are typically substituted for the executive may too easily 
become corporatist bodies controlled by the judges and impervious to political influence. Finding 
the right balance appears quite difficult indeed, and for that reason, I dOUbt that anyone model is 
the optimum solution for every society. But see Mary L. Volcant:ek, ApPOinting Judges the Euro-
pean Way, 34 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 363 (2007) (arguing that the European methods of judicial 
selection, whicb she chanlcterizes as either bureaucratic or as shared appointment systems, typi-
cally with quotas, are the best). ."-~~-. 
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The important role that judicial review plays in the adoptiou of struc-
tural protections for judicial independence shows that another important 
value in the culture of transformative law is belief in the value of separation 
of powers, and it is that value which is especially important for countering 
excessive claims by political leaders to concentrate power at the expense of 
the courts. Lord Acton's famous dictum that "[plower tends to corrupt and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely" appears to state an eternal truth. To-
gether with regular elections, separation of power and various systems of 
checks and balances are democracy's principal defenses against overween-
ing political power. The discussion in section IV(D) shows that when judi-
cial review was adopted. popular support for the courts' checking powers 
was apparently not limited to cases involving constitutional review. Thus 
the understanding that through their broad powers of interpretation, the 
courts can shape the law, even statutory law, in ways that ultimately pro-
vide some check on the power of the political branches appears to be part of 
the culture of transformative law. '70 
170. Some scholars have argued that true judicial independence requires a certain critical ap-
proach to the law itself, especially the statutory law. FriIhling, supm note la, at 243, 250 (Chilean 
courts failed to show independence from Pinochct regime by investigating human rights abuses 
because "they abdicated their duty to interpret and develop the law to uphold democratic princi-
ples"; Lo be sufficiently independent to defend human rights, Latin American courts need "to 
undertake a critical interpretation of rules passed by their legislatures"); Kim Lane Scheppeie, 
iJedarations of independence: Judicial Rew.:tiuns to Political Pressure, in JUDICIAL INDEPEN 
DENCE AT THE CROSSROADS 227 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) (extreme 
positivism, unleavened by constitutional principle!) or general principles of justice, results in mak-
ing the courts jmt as dependent on the political powers that promulgate the written law as if those 
powers dictated directly to the courts in individual cases). 
I have no doubt that this kind of "independence" from the ht\.v is an important aspect of 
judicial independence. It should be noted that traditional Islamic law courts appear to have en-
joyed this kind of independence at times, too, and probably to a very large degree in view of the 
indeterminate method of finding the law described above in section III(D). See ROSEN, ANTHRO-
POLOGY OF JUSTlCE, supra note 20, at 66-67 (examples from Islamic law of decisions in which the 
qadi manipulates or ignores the legal rules to achieve what he believes to be a more just result). 
But the question for purposes of reform is how much judicial independence from the positive 
law is to be encouraged. A,> I argued in section III{D), too much indeterminacy in the law finding 
process, as in traditional Islamic courts, wOllld seem to destroy the utility of law as a tool of social 
transformation. Perhaps some general reforms of legal education aimed at coullteracting traditions 
of excessive legal positivism could be worthwhile. B'Jt reforms aimed at increasing in general the 
degree to which judges feel free to modify or nullify the effect of statutory law based on the 
constitution or general legal principle could destabilize the legal system. Reformers may want 
judges to give real effect to constitutional provisions on hUman righls, for example, despite an 
inadequate statutory basis for doing so, but they do not want jl\(lges to view statutes as blank slates 
upon which to write their own versions of law. Frilhling, a professor of political science at the 
University of Chile, questions whether Latin American courts have the legitimacy necessary to 
adopt sllch a critical stance toward statutory law. Frlihling, SUpr<l note 10, at 250. 
The best course for reform is to concentrate on specific cases. Thus in section V(B), I suggest 
eff01ts to make certain types of lnw ill Ultin America more effective. Those efforts could, in 
appropriate cases, include specific arguments bnsed en constitutional or general principles to mod-
ify the apparently inadequate or contrary st,ttutory law to reach a result more in accord with basic 
principles of justice. 
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This article has looked at ancient Chinese and traditional Islamic law 
in order to use the stark contrast with very different systems to highlight 
features of the familiar Western legal systems whose importance might oth-
erwise not strike us as clearly. Two features of these non-Western legal 
systems that stand out in that contrast are (1) an extreme degree of personal-
ism in the dominant mode of thinking about human relationships and (2) the 
consequent potential for unequal application of the law, whether because 
the laws expressly distinguish among social classes, as in dynastic Chinese 
law, or because of a personalistic method of applying law, as in traditional 
Islamic law. By contrast, we can see that the transformative law culture in 
the Western legal traditions of the civil and common law is based on an 
ideal that insists on the equal treatment of people through an impersonal 
manner in applying law. Law tends to be regarded primarily as a system of 
formal distinctions, and to that extent, Western law does not ask the court to 
look at each party as a whole person with all her social and family ties, but 
only as a person abstracted to the specific features that the applicable law 
calls out as relevant in the specific case. 71 The rule of law adopts imper-
sonal application of law in an effort to ensure that law is applied equally to 
all persons who come within the terms of the law. The ability and willing-
ness to deal with people on an impersonal basis is thus linked to a very 
limited or basic aspect of equality having to do with the equal application of 
law. 
While varying degrees of personalism are no doubt found in every 
society, personalism is inconsistent with a culture of transformative law 
w hen it is so strong that one cannot expect law to be applied by its terms 
when it conflicts with the treatment that one party owes another party or the 
judge owes the parties based on personal or family connections, or rank or 
status. Seotion lII(D) above has argued that there is some evidence sug-
gesting that personalistic systems of caudillismo may continue to be strong 
enough in some Latin American countries to be an obstacle to judicial re-
forms to strengthen transformative law. 
Factors that would appear to work against extremely personalistic cul-
tures include the expanding role for bureaucracy in governments and in 
large businesses. Impersonal application of law by the state bureaucracy is 
part of the development by which modern states project bureaucratic power 
over social divisions based on more traditional societal ties of family, clan, 
and tribe. Modern business places similar expectations on its bureaucracies. 
To enable efficient action in markets, bureaucracies are expected to func-
tion largely according to internal rules and directions promulgated by the 
171. There is of course a contrary trend within the Western legal traditions, linked to equity 
within the common law tradiLion tlnd to general principles of Jaw within the civil law tradition, 
that prefers to see law as a series of principles LO be applied with sensitivity to the social context, 
rather than formal rules to be applied rigorously according to its terms, but that is not the domi~ 
nllnt approach in tbe Western legal traditions, especially in applying statutes. 
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business's leaders, not primarily according to the personal relations among 
the bureaucrats or between them and outsiders. Strengthening a culture of 
impersonal bureaucratic interactions would seem likely to strengthen a sim-
ilar culture among jurists, including judges, in the long run. While the 
prominent role that politics plays in the selection of U.S. judges somewhat 
obscures this pattern, judges in most countries, as illustrated by the histories 
in section IV for both France and Great Britain, are part of a specialized 
bureaucracy and are selected and supervised in largely bureaucratic fashion. 
The development of transformative law and judicial independence thus ap·· 
pears to be linked to the development of a culture of impersonal bureau-
cratic action in all its forms in both state and private sectors. 172 
Finally, this inquiry into transformative law and cultures that are not 
characterized by transformative law suggests an important-though less di-
rect-relationship to the general idea of equality. I have already claimed 
that the impersonal and formal method of applying law to individuals by 
considering only their traits that are made relevant by the applicable law is a 
very basic form of equal treatment. But it does not of course follow that all 
societies committed to such an impersonal application of law that they can 
adopt transformative law are necessarily committed to a broad equality 
principle. Clearly, transformative law can just as easily be used to increase 
inequality as decrease it. Think, for example, of laws adopted by the Nazi s 
to purge the German civil service of Jews. 173 Transformative law is a tool to 
decrease inequality only if it is specifically designed to do so. 
But it often is, and that is the connection between transformative law 
and judicial independence, on the one hand, and equality, on the other. 
Many examples of transformative law are adopted for the purpose of in-
creasing equality. For example, the two instances of transformative law 
172. Globallzation of trade unci investment, if it continues to be sustained, may provide some 
encouragement to reformers seeking to strengthen judicial independence. Multinational corpora-
tions bring their bureaucratic organization to the countries in which they do business. If local 
businesse:; are able to respond with market competition, they <lIsa will be pushed to adopt a more 
impersonal, market-based style. Thus it seems quite likely that both liberalization and globaliza-
tion of the economy wi!! eventually expose large parts of the population of a given country to the 
impersona!ism of market-based, business bureaucracies. This exposure could help moderate the 
extreme forms of personalism that may still be found in some Latin American countries though 
reform efforts afe needed to hasten this process. Economic reforms to encourage the growth of 
private business may thus do much to strengthen key values of a culture of transfonnati ve law and 
judicial independence. Cf John Reitz, Export of the Rule of LaH', 13 TRANsNAT'L L. & CONTElVIP. 
PROBS. 429, 472-74 (2003) (arguing that development of commercial law could be an engine to 
develop the rule of law culture). The development of governmental bureaucracy is not by itself 
necessarily benign. For example, the kind of "bureaucratic authoritarianism" to which Guillermo 
O'Donnell hilS pointed in Latin AmericCi moves in the opposite direction by leading to authoritari-
anism instead of democracy and a state-dominated economy instead of liberalization. See GUIL-
LERMO O'DONNELL, MODERNIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC-AuTl-IOR!TARJANlSM (1973). 
173. LINDER, SlIpr[/ note 40, at 147-50 (describing the "Law pertaining to the Restoration of 
the Professional Civil Service (BBG) of 7 April 1933." which providd for the retirement of all 
tenured civil servants of non-Aryan descent, and other related laws that gradually prohibited Jews 
from positions in government <lnd from quite a few p:·ivate sectors of the economy). 
--- -._--------
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cited at the beginning of section III, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, are both intended to increase 
formal and substantive equality by eliminatiLlg certain forms of discrimina-
tion against women and racial minorities and against the disabled, respec-
tively. Moreover, the goal of increasing equality may be a politically 
attractive one, especially in today's world, strongly influenced by interna-
tional human rights discourse, in which principles of equality playa leading 
role. Transformative law for the purpose of expanding equality may there-
fore be likely to attract substantial public support. Such transformative law 
seems most likely to set up the type of dynamic described in section III that 
could lead to substantial support for curbing undue executive influence over 
the courts. Law that seeks to transform society by expanding equality is 
thus an especially important type of transfo1l11ative law. There are grounds 
to think that the ideal of equality is not well supported on the whole in Latin 
America, 174 but efforts to strengthen the implementation of transformative 
law that already exists in Latin America could be a particularly effective 
way to strengthen the social commitment to equality and thus increase so-
cial support for transformative law. In the next and last section of the arti-
cle, we will look at some examples of this kind of law in Latin America that 
might offer an especially useful basis for reform efforts attempting to 
strengthen the transformative law cultnre in various Latin American 
countries. 
B. Examples of Reform Strategies for Strengthening the Culture of 
Transformative Law and Judicial Independence ;n Latin 
America 
This article has focused on the social and political logic of popular 
support for judicial independence in a democracy for the purpose of devel-
oping strategies for reforms that could use that logic to strengthen popular 
support for judicial independence from the extremes of executive control. 
The article has proposed belief in the transformative role of law as a key 
174. I do not know whether one can say that Latin American culture generally lacks sufficient 
commitment to equality, see, e.g., Rosenn, supra note 10, at 35 (suggesting that commitment to 
equality is too superficial in Latin America to SUppOlt an independent judiciary), but Latin Ameri-
can society remains characterized by enormolls economic and social inequalities. Jorge DomIn-
guez, The Politics of Hope: Free Politics and Free Markets in Larin America, 5 U. ST. THOMAS 
LJ. 625 (2009). Latin America experienced a revival of democratic governance at the end of the 
twentieth century, and democracy suggests substantially egalitarian thinking, but democracies 
bave not proven to be very stable in Latin America in the. nineleenth and twentieth centuries. In 
the twentieth century, Latin America has also been strongly influenced hy forms of wcial and 
political organization known as "corporatism," essentially a theory that society should be com-
posed of groups, each of which had specific functions and the fights ancl obligations that relate to 
those functions, Although corporatism takes a variety of forms, in most case::; it rejected egalitari-
anism, teaching that inequality i::; part of the natural oreler. LEWIS, supra note 40, at 129-31. To 
the extent that way of thinking is ::;til1 important in Latin America, it represents a fUJ1her obstacle 
to reform based on transformative law. 
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value which has the potential to engender that kind of popular support. I 
would suppose that many kinds of reform strategies could be devised to 
take advantage of the logic discussed in this article, but there is space here 
to discuss only a few examples. It is important to preface this discussion 
with the caveat that I am not arguing that belief in transformative law will 
quickly or easily lead to formation of a culture supportive of greater degrees 
of judicial independence. My argument is only that a culture that adopts law 
for the purpose of changing society sets up the dynamic that Shapiro has 
described. In time, it seems likely that this dynamic should induce popular 
support for judicial freedom from executive dominance. 
One clear implication of the historical sketch in section IV is that 
roughly around the time of adoption of judicial review of the constitutional-
ity of legislation there is likely to be a rethinking of the role of courts that 
creates significant popular support for curbing executive power over the 
regular courts, and this seems to be true whether or not judicial review is 
confined to a constitutional court. The period of adoption of judicial review 
has already passed in a literal sense for many Latin American countries 
because they adopted judicial review of the constitutionality of both legisla-
tive and executive action some time ago. However, in many countries, judi-
cial review has not prospered, and Latin American history is littered with 
attempts to suppress or restrict constitutional review. 175 In countries that 
have experienced significant curtailment of judicial review and have not yet 
succeeded in reestablishing a credible form of judicial review, there is an 
opp011unity to renew the commitment to judicial review in ways that might 
bring the issue of executive domination of the judiciary to the top of the 
political agenda and cause a reconsideration of the courts' role as a third 
branch of government equal to the other two branches. Thus working to 
establish or strengthen judicial review of legislation may have the potential 
in some countries to strengthen support for greater independence of the ju-
diciary as a whole. 
175. For example, Argentina has witnessed the rOlltine repJucement en masse of its supreme 
court after each regime change from the 1930& through the 1980s, foHowecJ by President-Elect 
Carlos Menem's court-packing scheme in 1990, Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of Strategic Defec-
tioll: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 291, 292 (2002); see aIm Robert Barros, Courts Ollt of Context: Allthorirarian SOl/rees 
of Judicia! FClilllre ill Chile (/973-1990) and Argentina (1976-1983), in RULE BY LAW 156lTom 
Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) [hereina:ter "RULE BY LAW"]; Lisa Hilbink, Agetlts of 
Allti-Politics: COllrts in Pinochet's Chile, il1 RULE BY LAW 102; Bentriz Magaloni, Enforcing the 
Autocratic Po(itica{ Order olld the Role of Courts: The Case of Me.rico, in Ruu:: BY LAW 180 
(how Mexican presidents from the 19303 to 199..:. manipulated the constitution and the courts): 
Anthony W. Pereira, Of Judges ami Gt'nerals: Security COllrTS Under Autlwritaritm Regimes ill 
ArgeJ1tilla, Bra,;.!I, alld Chile, in RULE BY LAW 23 I,use of special courts to take sensitive cases out 
of jurisdiction of regular COLlt'ts); Schor, supm note 14, at 4 (example,'; rmm Mexico, Venezuela, 
Peru, Argentina, and Ecuador of president,'; who attempted to manipulate their constitutions andlor 
supreme courts), 
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Another part of public law that seems particularly promising is admin-
istrative law though it must be conceded tllat the historical sketch in section 
IV may seem to suggest the contrary. Both Great Britain and France devel-
oped judicial review of administrative action in the nineteenth century, but 
France did not adopt significant structural protections for the independence 
of the regular judiciary until the second half of the twentieth century, and 
Great Britain followed even later. France tinally adopted some structural 
protections for the lower administrative court judges in the 1 990s, but it still 
preserves a disciplinary system for the administrative court judges that 
threatens them with political control and subjects the judges of the highest 
administrative court to blatant political control in both their selection and 
discipline. As a motor for driving the development of a more independent 
judiciary, administrative law would appear fairly ineffectual. 
But judicial review of administrative action fits Shapiro's model in a 
compelling way. The govel'l1ment is a formal party to every case. Moreover, 
these kinds of cases involve regulation, which, as I have conceded, 176 
means generally the same thing as transformative Jaw and tends to involve 
politically salient law. The executive is thm both formally and substantively 
an interested party in most cases. Executive control over the courts should 
be obviously troublesome for the broad public affected by judicial review. 
Perhaps in an earlier day, governments could get away with providing for 
judicial review of administrative action in courts they controlled. The pres-
tigious French system was developed from a model of administrative justice 
that was restricted to asking a higher body within the administration itself to 
take another look at challenged administrative action.177 But the French 
model has developed into a case of true judicial review, as the recent adop-
tion of structural protections for the lower administrative comi judges sug-
gests, and it is becoming less and less acceptable throughout the world to 
restrict review of administrative action to a second look by higher levels of 
the administration. Today, even the few countries still ruled by communist 
parties see the need to provide judicia/review of administrative action as a 
way of bolstering regime legitimacy. 178 Popular desire to be protected from 
arbitrary and illegal administrative action may be propelling judicial review 
of at least some signiticant forms of administrative action into the ranks of a 
legal universal. 179 Efforts to strengthen judicial review of administrative 
176. See supm section III(C). 
177. That model helps explain why the nineteenth-century French thought that review by a 
body within the administration, the judicial chamber of the Council of State, was a sufficient form 
of review. See supra section IVCB). 
178. KARIN BUHMANN, IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RI0C'lTS THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW RE" 
FORMS: THE POTENTIAL IN CHINA AND VIETNAM 469, 561 (2001) (China anel Vietnam). 
179. Cf. John Reitz, Progress in Bllilding In:aifuliol1s for the Rule (~f Law, il1 DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY AND POST-COMMUNIST CHANGE 144, 159-62 (Robert Greyed., 1997) (describing the 
"long historical roots" of judiciall'cview of administrative acts in socialist COUll tries and the rapid 
expansion of that kind of judicial review after 1989 in Russia and Poland). 
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action by trying to increase the degree to which it actually protects individ-
uals from arbitrary government action should therefore be an effective way 
to build support for reasonable levels of judicial independence from the 
government, at least over the long term. 180 
Finally, the discussion of the connection between transformative law 
and equality suggests that strategies of promoting law reform in areas that 
seek to expand equality ought to be particularly effective at building public 
support for judicial independence from executive control. In this connec-
tion, Jorge Esquirol names three areas of substantive law as representing 
lasting achievements of Latin American law-he calls them part of the ac-
quis Legaux in Latin America-labor law, the social function doctrine in 
property law, and economic and social rights that have been recognized as 
constitutional rights. lSi These examples all appear to involve transformative 
law that seeks to expand equality. Working to secure a just and effective 
implementation of the rules in these areas of law-perhaps by educating 
lawyers and judges, amending the law to eliminate problems or defects with 
the law, educating the public, devising arguments to use constitutional or 
general principles of law to modify or supplement statutory terms that are 
lacking in justice, 182 and facilitating the formal assertion of rights under the 
180. Most important cases are said to be in the ad:ninistrative COLlrts in Latin America, not in 
the regular courts. Jorge Santistevan de Noriega, Reform of the Latin American Judicia!)l, 16 FLA. 
1. 1NT'L L. 161 (2004). 
181. EsC]uirol, supra nole 3, at 118-24. It is clear enough how labor law and economic and 
social rights that have the status of constitutional rights represenl attempts to transform society 
and expand equality. The social functjon doctline of property law is illustrated by the Brazilian 
Federal Constitution of 1988 and the new Brazilian Civil Code of 2002, both of which adl)pted a 
concept of properly as having socia! and environmental fl1nction~, as well as individual economic 
functions. Daniela Diz & Lars T. Soeflesta.d, W(Jfer Resources as a Common Good if! Brazil: 
Legal Reform Bet,veer! Theory and Pmcrice (2004), (!Wlilable at Digita! Library of the Commons, 
http://d1c.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/OOOO 1529100/Diz_ Watec040806.pdf (pro petty rights have to 
be exercised in accordance with economic and social aims to preserve the environment); Ngai 
Pindell, Finding (I Right to the City: Exploring Property and Community in Bro::.iI and in tile 
United States, 39 V AND. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 436, 452-55 (2006) (Articles 182 and 183 of the 1988 
Brazilian Constitution tie the social fUllction of property to master plan process for urban land use, 
and the City Statute of 2001 provides for implementation of those constitutional rules so that, 
under certain circumstances, squatters can gain a legal right to use bOlh private and public land). If 
it is correct that the issue of squatters' rights presents a risk of extreme politicization that could 
cause the Brazilian military to intervene again in political life, see Daniel Zirkel', Property Rights, 
Democrati;.{/fiol1, alld Military Politics in Brazil, 33 1. POL. & MIL. Soc. 125 (2005), perhaps that 
issue might not be a reasonable one on which to base reform efforts. Reformers have to pick their 
battles with an eye toward protecting the courts. But the social funclion doctrine appears to be 
suitabk for application across a broad spectrum of property issues, and the environmental applica-
tions may be more likely to engender broad public SLlpport. It should be noted that "[t]he 19~8 
Constitution was drafted at a time wben the belief in the transformative power of law was at its 
height and the Brazilian government played a central role in ordering economic and socia! devel-
opment," Megan Bullard, The crtlsh Benl'l'en Local Courtj' tlnd Gloha{ Economics: The Politics of 
Judiciul Reform ill Bra::JI, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 230, 247 (1999) (cited in Pindell, slipra. at 
452), so the doctrine at' sl~ciaJ function represents abollt us clear an example of transformati ve law 
as one can imagine. 
18'2. Sa SlIprd note 170 (regarding judicial "independenl'e" from positive law). 
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law by making counsel available or securing evidence-is therefore likely 
to contribute significantly to building a culture of transformative law and 
judicial independence, and if these really do constitute part of the acquis 
legaux in Latin America, efforts devoted to these areas are likely to be sup-
ported by a substantial part of the population. 
I recognize that there is a certain "chicken and egg" quality to these 
recommendations. For a country in which the executive branch exerts too 
much influence over the judges, judicial review based on constitutional 
rights Of nonconstitutional administrative law, labor law, or the social func-
tion doctrine of property would all no doubt be more effective if the judges 
were more independent, and yet I am urging that efforts be made to 
strengthen judicial independence by strengthening the effectiveness of the 
law. Which comes first, the office of the judge or the judge's function in 
these various areas of law? The answer of course is that they are so interre-
lated that neither comes before the other. We have to work on both at the 
same time. The main point is that for too long legal refofm efforts have 
concentrated 011 trying to influence the substantive functioning of law by 
concentrating on institutional reforms. Those efforts are important, but not 
sufficient. Reform also has to address the substantive functioning of the law 
because that is what builds popular support for the courts in their continual 
battle against the threat of executi ve dominance. 
In the end, however, the success of reform efforts aimed at the courts 
depends on the judges themselves and on the quality of their decisions. We 
cannot escape that fact. But it also leads us to consider a kind of miracle. In 
the midst of his argument that judges cannot and will not be free of govern-
mental control and right after listing the ways that various regimes have 
undercut judicial independence, Shapiro writes, "the prevalence of these ... 
tactics is testimony to the real independence of judiciaries. In many nations 
at many times judges have been sufficiently their own masters to require 
even highly centralized regimes to adopt special tactics to avoid sharing 
power with them."l83 That despite strong political influence, some judges 
assert their independence to decide cases before them as they think the law 
requires without yielding to political pressure is testimony to their dedica-
tion to the ideal of deciding cases under law, not politics. This kind of 
judicial behavior may actually make the greatest contribution to promoting 
popular support for judicial independence. To those judges this article is 
dedicated. 
183, SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 34. 
